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Introduction
In his groundbreaking 1903 treatise, The Souls of Black Folk,
W.E.B. Du Bois wrote, "the problem of the twentieth century is the
problem of the color-line." 1 A century later, and a generation
removed from the struggles of the Civil Rights era, many now
suggest that class, not race, is the greatest cleavage in American
society. 2
They maintain that any real or apparent racial
inequality between racialized groups is better explained by class
and culture, and that if race ever had any explanatory power, that
time is now behind us. 3 A declining minority stresses that race is
still important and that in a number of circumstances race
continues to trump class. 4 Those who advocate this position often
point to the residential segregation of even middle class Blacks,
racial profiling, or even the difficulty Black men encounter in
fetching a cab in New York City.5 This debate is not academic.
Public opposition to race-based affirmative action is justified in
part by a class assertion. 6 Others have argued that we should

* Williams Chair in Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Moritz College of Law, Ohio
State University; Executive Director, Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and
Ethnicity, Ohio State University.
1. W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 15 (Modern Library ed., The
Modern Library 2003) (1953).
2. See, e.g., Adolph Reed, The Real Divide, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 2005, at
27-32, available at http://progressive.org/mag-reedll05.
3. See id.
4. See generally DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACIsM AND AMERICAN LAW (2000)
(discussing segregation in public schools, housing, and discrimination in voting
rights and the administration of justice); LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE
MINER'S CANARY (2002).

5. See Reed, supra note 2, at 31; see also RICHARD KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY:
CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 162 (1996).

6. See KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 115 (discussing how affirmative action
used to be popular when the economy was prosperous but as family incomes in the
United States start to fall flat, race-based affirmative action is becoming less
popular).
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pursue class based integration and drop the call for racial
integration of K-12. 7 This debate is so familiar that we seldom
linger to ask: 'What is race and class?" Further, we fail to reflect
on how they have influenced each other's development in America.
The answer affects the way we carry out social policy, make law,
and
create
meaning.
Uncovering the influence
and
interrelationship of race and class is the aim of this Article.
More specifically, this Article argues that the development of
a socially-inclusive agenda must account for race, class, and their
interrelationship. 8 There is a prevailing assumption in liberal
discourse that race and class are analytically separable and that it
would be a wiser course, as a matter of strategy, to address racial
disparities through class-based measures. 9 Liberals worry that a
focus on race will quickly degenerate into a narrow form of
balkanization and identity politics, alienating potential allies and
population segments that might be receptive to a progressive
message.'( This Article asserts that these assumptions are wrong
analytically, historically, and strategically.
Many traditional
liberals also long believed that conservatives enjoyed the
"unwarranted support from poor and working-class Whites in the
South because the race question diverted them from pursuing
their 'real interests.""' They assumed that the extension of the
right to vote and other civil rights for southern Blacks would
diminish the importance of racial issues and result in a classbased realignment in which southern working class Whites would
7. See, e.g., KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 99-100, 155-156; see also Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REV.
1913 (1996); Martha Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest,
and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 800 n.2 (2003) (citing R.
Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-based
College Admissions, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1029 (2001)); Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing
Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 452 (1997); Deborah C.
Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1847 (1996); Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based Affirmative
Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472 (1997).
8. We will focus on the race aspect of this dynamic both because of its
importance but also because of the current trend to move away from race. See
Reed, supra note 2, at 31; see also Ward Connerly, The Michigan Win, THE NAT'L
REVIEW
ONLINE,
Jan.
30,
2007,
http:/article.nationalreview.com/?q=
MjYwYThkMGNjZmE3OTE4ZjBmMzQOYTBkNzZkNzAOYWE= (last visited Mar.
26, 2007). I believe this is a destructive move that must be corrected if we are to
have a fair society not just for those raced as non-White, but for all Americans.
9. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 2, at 31-32.
10. See id.
11. MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE COLOR OF POLITICS 8 (1997) (discussing the
views of. V.O. Key).
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act more like their northern counterparts. 12 Paradoxically, the
politics of the North and the nation as a whole since the late 1960s
have become more like that of the old South; race is now more
successfully used in defense of conservative politics in the country
as a whole. 13 Part of the explanation for this error is due to an
inadequate understanding of how race operates.
Conservatives rightly point out that race is a socially
constructed category with no scientific or biological basis.' 4 As
such, many conservatives believe that the harm caused by race is
the harm of racial classification. Continuing to see race, in their
view, perpetuates racial stereotypes and stigmatizes people on the
basis of skin color.' 5 Many conservatives make the mistake that if
something is not real by one measure (in this case biology), it must
not be real at all.' 6 Although race is a scientific illusion, it
remains a social reality that shapes our life chances and the way
we experience both our external and internal world.1 7 Those who
espouse the race-neutral position, on the left and the right, are
basing their view on an inadequate understanding of the role of
race in our society in the twentyfirst century.
While they might appear quite different, both of these views
rest on similar faulty assumptions. They understand racism as a
psycho-social event that occurs between discrete individuals with a
focus on the psychological motivation of the prejudicial actor.
While liberals would include unconscious prejudice and
within
individual
internal
motivation,
discrimination
conservatives would focus on more overt and intentional
discrimination and be skeptical of unconscious explanations.
Conservatives are more likely to explain persistent racial
disparities as bad choices of the racial other caused by a culture of
poverty. For both groups then, racial disparities only require
redress when there are identifiable, bad, discriminatory actors and
particular victims and the remedy will likely require transferring
This limited
resources between Whites and non-Whites.' 8
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See Carol R. Goforth, "What is She?" How Race Matters and Why It
Shouldn't, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 9-11 (1996).

15. See Connerly, supra note 8.
16. See john a. powell, The Colorblind Multiracial Dilemma: Racial Categories
Reconsidered, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 789, 790 (1997).
17. See john a. powell, Dreaming of a Self Beyond Whiteness and Isolation, 18
WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 13, 13, 39-42 (2005).
18. Because race and racism are identified as static, it is assumed that the
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understanding of race assumes that racism is primarily about
discrimination and the needs of non-Whites.
This model of
victim/perpetrator, disparity, and either unconscious racism or bad
culture does not sufficiently explain current inequalities nor does
it grapple with the complex work that racial and ethnic identity do
within the larger society.
I assert that there is a broader, richer understanding of race
that is not only about individual, intentional, or unconscious
discrimination directed at people of color.
While individual
prejudice and discrimination remain relevant, I will assert that
race, racial meanings, and racial practices are really about all
people in the United States, cultural meaning, institutional
arrangements, and their interactions. These inter-institutional
actions and structures cannot be understood by looking for a single
cause. They produce outcomes through multiple interactions
better understood as cumulative mutual causation. One of my
assertions is that racial practices in the United States help define
the meaning and development of our understanding, and the
practices of class. The story of the fight for states' rights, unions,
our electoral system, and limited federal government is radically
incomplete without being informed by race. 19
Equally,
fragmentation
in
metropolitan
space
with
segregated
neighborhoods and high poverty schools cannot simply be
explained by racially-neutral, local controls. 20 I am not asserting
that race is more important than class, but I am rejecting the
notion that class explains race. Instead I am asserting that race
and class are distinct and at the same time mutually constitutive,
recursive processes in the United States that render race and class
radically incoherent without understanding their interactive
nature.
In Part II, I will focus on the heavy footprint race has left on
the development and meaning of class in the United States.
Racial meaning, identity, and practices have helped shape class
identity and inhibit class consciousness. I will also show how
racist attitudes, the creation of racial identities, and the

absence of prejudiced actors means that there is no racism. Race, racial meanings,
and racism are an evolving set of social practices and circumstances that change
just as other social practices change.
19. See infra, Part II. A. and B.
20. See INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, RAcISM AND METROPOLITAN DYNAMICS 4
(2002),
available
at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/irp/publications/
racismandmetrodynamics.pdf.
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institutionalization of racial systems are themselves tied to
economic development and influenced by economic fears and
needs. Race and class are too often presented as opposing frames
or reducible into the other. This Article rejects the claim that race
and class can be reduced into each other.
In Part III, this Article turns to the importance of race in
coalition building as the United States becomes a majorityminority nation. We have yet to grasp the full import of Martin
Luther King Jr.'s insight that the fates of all Americans are linked
across racial boundaries. 21 While it is important to understand
this linkage, failure to appreciate that class and race interests are
both real and distinct in our society has too often seduced us into
believing poor Whites and poor non-Whites have the same coterminus "real interest." The challenge is to build general and
specific interests both along racial and economic axes, as well as
along other significant interests that may emerge. This requires
what I call a transformative set of programs and a transformative
discourse, i.e., an intervention that works to permanently
transform structural arrangements and to support new economic
and racial interest and identification. 22 Efforts must be at the
same time sensitive to existing and emerging universal values and
ideals while being grounded in the shifting particularity of
individuals and groups and their concrete lives. I call this effort
"targeted universalism."
While it is clear there needs to be a focus on class and
economic issues, unless properly approached, such an effort is
unlikely to be fruitful.
What we normally call class-based
alternatives are misnomers and ultimately conservative. These
alternatives are transactional rather than transformative. They
focus on promoting disadvantaged individuals to the status of
middle class rather than on transforming or restructuring the
relations between classes on a more equitable basis. Because of
the individualistic character of such proposals, they are not a
useful organizing mechanism for building a coalition on the basis
of shared interests or a sense of solidarity. A socially-inclusive

21. THE REV. DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., LETTER FROM BIRMINGHAM JAIL 2
(The Overbrook Press 1968) ("We are caught in an inescapable network of
mutuality tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly affects
all indirectly.")
22. A transactional intervention, on the other hand, is one that may impact
outcomes across several domains but does not fundamentally change the way
structures and institutions operate.
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alternative requires addressing race and building cross-class and
multi-racial coalitions.
This Article challenges the assumption that race is
necessarily divisive and disturbs the project of building a coalition
with a socially inclusive agenda. By most accounts, the greatest
improvement in racial attitudes for Whites occurred during the
heart of the Civil Rights Movement, despite the heightened and
forthright focus on race. While race can be, and has been used
divisively, 23 it can also be used in a transformative manner which
helps to bring people together. Indeed, it is extremely doubtful
that an inclusive and just society can be built without deeply
engaging race. I will also show how skillful politicians have used
colorblind racism through symbolic appeals and coded meanings to
undermine efforts to build an inclusive agenda in the United
States. 24 Racialized systems, and the resistance to change they
inspire, obstruct the advancement of a socially-inclusive agenda
25
with negative consequences for Whites and non-Whites alike.
The answer is not, therefore, to avoid discussions of race. It is
already in the discourse, albeit in a subterranean manner. The
question is not whether race will be used, but how. Silence is
concession to a use of race that will continue to blunt reform and
stymie efforts to build a new movement for a fairer society. The
response must be to make race explicit, but in a transformative
manner.
I. The Racial Dimension of Class in the United States
Because race and class are so often used in American
discourse, we have difficulty noticing that we understand class
even less than race, and that our understandings of both are
woefully shallow. Unfortunately, both terms as they are currently
23. See Linda Faye Williams, The Constraint of Race: Slavery, the Legacy of
the "White Citizen," and American Social Policy, Repairing the Past: Confronting
the Legacies of Slavery, Genocide, and Caste 4, 11-12 (Oct. 27-29, 2005)
(unpublished article, available at http://www.yale.edu/glc/justice/williams.pdf
)(describing Whites in the South who would not go to a church, would not swim in a
pool, and would take their children out of schools to avoid any interaction with
Blacks).
24. See Williams, supra note 23, at 13 (giving the example of the "welfare
queen"); see also GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 8.

25. As one commentator recently concluded in the wake of Hurricane Katrina,
"For race is the biggest reason the United States, unique among advanced
countries, is ruled by a political movement that is hostile to the idea of helping
citizens in need." Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Tragedy in Black and White, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2005, at Al.
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used more effectively obfuscate than enlighten. Perhaps the most
glaring flaw in our popular formulations of race and class is that
they are assumed to be phenotypical markers on one hand, or
economic locations a-historically derived and a-contextually
applied on the other. But class is more than annual income, just
as race is more than skin color. Race and class acquired their
meaning over time and are not comprehensible outside their
historical social context. 26 For this reason, and because so much of
our racial meaning and practices are reflective of our cultural
narratives and formative structures, 27 this Article will look back
on some of the historical moments when these narratives and
structures were being constituted and contested. Although a
comprehensive delineation of race and class is beyond the scope of
this Article, the junctures I highlight continue to influence the
understanding of race and class in the United States in the 21st
28
Century.
A. Race and Class at the Revolution
Racial dimensions in the class structure were visible in the
United States as early as the seventeenth century with the
creation of citizen patrols of slave populations. 29
This
arrangement was prototypical of the need to control the
"dangerous racial other" and early forms of competition and
identity. 30 It evolved into a dual structure for race and class by
the time of the American Revolution.
"The American Revolution was fought in the name of liberty.
On the road to independence, no word was more frequently
invoked.. . ."31 The revolutionary victory and the republican
ideology that it spawned emphasized independence. "Freeman," a
critical ingredient of the new American identity, contemplated
both "the double
meaning of economic
and political

26. See Martha Mahoney, Whiteness and Remedy: Under-Ruling Civil Rights in
Walker v. City of Mesquite, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1309, 1323 (2000).
27. See infra Part II. A.
28. Though the racialization of the Native Americans is foundational to our
understanding of race, we do not discuss it in this Article.
29. See, e.g., STEVE MARTINOT, THE RULE OF RACIALIZATION, 28-74 (2003). See
generally TED ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE (1994) (arguing that the

process of racialization conditioned the initial structuring of class as a predominant
way of organizing).
30. MARTINOT, supra note 29, at 79-80.
31. ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 12(1998).
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independence." 32 And yet, before the revolution, many people,
both White and Black, enjoyed neither. In colonial America, most
Whites did not vote and many colonists were indentured
servants. 33 Indentured servants made up a significant portion of
the non-slave labor force, 34 and "as late as the early 1770s, nearly
half the immigrants who arrived in America from England and
Scotland had entered into contracts for a fixed period of labor in
exchange for passage." 35 The circumstances of African slavery and
European servitude were not all that different. "Indentured
servants often worked in the fields alongside slaves. Like slaves,
servants could be bought and sold, were subject to corporal
punishment, and their obligation to fulfill their duties was
enforced by the courts." 36 White freedom in the colonial era was
partial and existed on a continuum that was not always clearly
distinguishable from Black slavery.
Servitude was incompatible with republican citizenship.
White indentured servitude was eliminated after the revolution. 37
Formerly indentured Europeans were converted to the republican
ideology by appeals to freedom and promises of release from
bondage. 38 The European servant transformed into a free White
laborer. For a brief moment, the epidemic of freedom appeared to
threaten the continued existence of slavery as well. To many of
the founders, both Northern and Southern, the right to liberty was
an endowment of the Creator. 39 According to David Roediger, "the
32. DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS 56 (rev.ed. 1999).

33. In Connecticut, for example, there were twice as many inhabitants as
freeman in the late 1780s.

See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION 503

(2005) (cited in Conversation with ARA, Aug. 2002 and CHRISTOPHER COLLIER, A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
(1988)).

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.

110-112

See FONER, supra note 31, at 10.

Id.
Id. at 10-11.
See id. at 19. Apprenticeship, a similar institution, was also on the wane.

38. See ROEDIGER, supra note 32, at 32.
39. See WINTHROP JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN 118-122 (1974) (arguing

that the American Revolution provoked a revolution in American consciousness).
Secular equalitarianism was a result of the convergence of environmentalism, a
popular mode of thought in the revolutionary era, and the dogma of natural rights.
Further:
During this third quarter of the eighteenth century, many Americans
awoke to the fact that a hitherto unquestioned social institution had
spread its roots not only throughout the economic structure of much of the
country but into their own minds. As they became conscious of this
infiltration they came to recognize that enslavement of the Negro
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proximity of unfree whites and Black chattel slaves on a
continuum of oppression helped create sympathies that ensured
that the 'contagion of liberty' during and after the upheaval of the
Revolution would result in attacks on racial slavery as well as
40
indentured servitude."
Unfortunately, the potential for class based solidarity born of
the shared experience of servitude did not survive the
revolutionary moment. While White indentured servitude died out
peacefully, Black slavery was ended only by civil war and
constitutional amendment. 41 Powerful economic and political
interests protected Black slavery. The Southern economy, built
upon lifelong hereditary Black bondage, was able to extract
maximum profits through low-cost, coerced labor. 42 Southern
elites, ironically, claimed that they were dependent upon African
slavery at the same time that the dependence of slaves was used
as one of the reasons they were unfit to be citizens in the new
43
republic.
The formation of the Union depended upon the acceptance of
slavery in the South. Each of our Nation's formative institutions
protected this racial arrangement, none more importantly than
the Constitution itself.44 Although the word slavery does not
appear in the Constitution, many provisions were included for the
purpose of protecting it. 45 The divide over slavery and the

depended on their assessment of him, that Negro slavery existed within
themselves, within their "prejudices," particularly "in relation to color."
Id.
40. ROEDIGER, supra note 32, at 30.
41. See id. at 32; see also AMAR, supra note 33, at 351.
42. See JONATHAN HUGES & LouIs P. CAIN, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 168
(5th ed. 1998). "Slaveholders constituted the wealthiest class in the country by
far. The average slaveowner was more than five times as wealthy as the average
northern, more than ten times as wealthy as the average non-slaveohlding
southern farmer." Id. It is important to recognize that the South was not
monolithic when it came to slavery. Winthrop Jordan reflects some of this nuance
when he says "there was not one south, but two and a half." JORDAN, supra note 39,
at 126.
The economic differences, patterns of antislavery sentiment, and
population of slaves in the south separated the upper south from the lower south
with North Carolina as "an anomalous borderland." Id.
43. See, e.g., GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 70 (stating that General Pinkney, a
representative from South Carolina, said that without slaves, "South Carolina
would soon be a desert waste").
44. See FONER, supra note 31, at 35 (stating that the proposed Constitution, in
the words of James Madison, "offered slavery 'better security than any that now
exists."') .
45. FONER, supra note 31, at 36 (quoting Benjamin Rush, who apparently wrote
that the use of the word would "contaminate the glorious fabric of American
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Constitution created a structure in which the states became the
primary political units and retained wide authority over internal
matters. As such, the federal structure, and the limited federal
government erected by the Constitution, "insulated slavery in the
states from outside interference ....
"46
Article I temporarily

47
barred Congress from acting to end the importation of slaves.

Article IV, section 2 placed an affirmative duty on free states to
return fugitive slaves to their place of service, 48 drawing even
those states that opposed slavery into the control stratum. Article
V prohibited any Amendment seeking to reverse the bargain that
protected the slave trade until 1808.49

Most importantly, the

Constitution's Three-Fifth's Clause 50 ensured that slaveholders led
51
the process of nation building until the election of Lincoln.
The contradiction between the ideal of personal liberty and
the existence of slavery was an uncomfortable ethical and
philosophical tension. 52 Race emerged as the "justification for the
existence of slavery in a nation ideologically committed to freedom
as a natural right,"53 and the beginning of an enduring racialized
ideology appeared. 54 By the nineteenth century, notions of Black
liberty"); see also Donald J. D'Elia, Dr. Benjamin Rush and The Negro, J. HIsT.
IDEAS 419 (1969).
46. FONER, supra note 31 at 36. Even though the federal government may be
far more powerful today than it was in the 19th Century, I believe that the divide
the Constitution created, formed a structural legacy in which the states became the
primary political unit.
47. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
48. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
49. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
50. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
51. See MARTINOT, supra note 29, at 83. See also AMAR, supra note 33, at 20-21
(arguing that since slaves counted toward congressional apportionment, each slave
state was awarded extra seats in the electoral college and in the Congress relative
to its free population). Amar notes this acted as a "perverse incentive [ ] to
maintain and even expand slavery. If a state freed its slaves and the freedmen
then moved away, the state might actually lose House seats." Id. at 21.
52. See MARTINOT, supra note 29, at 6-7.
53. FONER, supra note 31, at 40.
54. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 15-16 (summarizing the argument of
Stanley Greenberg, RACE AND STATE IN CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT (1980)).
Greenberg argues that racial systems of discrimination did not originate in culture
or individual attitudes,
rather, they were originally rooted in the economic needs and desires of
large agricultural producers to have highly exploited and controlled black
labor forces. The social and political structures and the racial identities
that were required to sustain such a system were by necessity codified and
extended to the societies as a whole.... Both the difficulty of overcoming
racist attitudes among whites and the problems faced by racially
solidaristic labor movements must be explained within this context.
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inferiority and White superiority had matured into full fledged
ideologies that defined many of the United States' early
institutions as well as its individual and national identity. 55 In
the South, theories of scientific racism and polygenesis took root
and flourished. 56
In the North, "Republicanism had long
emphasized that the strength, virtue, and resolve of a people
guarded them from enslavement. .. . White revolutionary pride
could thus open the way for republican racism." 5 7 In the minds of
working class Whites, who soon forgot their own sojourn in unpaid
labor, the explanation for Black slavery became located in Blacks
themselves. Whiteness was not simply about color or historical
root, but was defined in opposition to Blackness and the conditions
of servitude that came to be associated with Blacks. 58 The
development of racialized identity in America coincided with the
historic development of the American psyche.
B. Industrializationand White Suffrage
American industrialization and the concomitant rise of wage
labor posed a profound challenge for the ethos that defined
economic dependence as incompatible with freedom. In the 1830s
and 1840s, a "free labor" ideology became prominent, emphasizing
the belief "that workers should be free and able to demand
remuneration commensurate with their skill and tradition."5 9 Yet
"by 1860, roughly half of the non-slave labor force was dependent
on wage labor and subject to new forms of capitalist labor
discipline." 60 The commodification of free labor with a wage
system met with resistance. 61 It disrupted the understanding that
Changing the systems of racial domination and subordination ultimately
requires the challenging and overthrowing of those economic interests that
gain the most.
Id. From this perspective, the Constitution, in the words of Goldfield, "codified" the
racial system used by the South and extended it to the society as a whole. See id.
at 73. The political architecture of our nation subsequently enhanced the racial
arrangement in ways that will become clear later in this Article.
55. See generally GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE

MIND (1987) (describing the various ideologies and ideas that emerged in the 19th
Century).
56. See id. at 71-96.
57. ROEDIGER, supra note 32, at 35.
58. See id. at 35-36.
59. MARTINOT, supra note 29, at 84.
60. ROEDIGER, supra note 32, at 20.
61. See FONER, supra note 31, at 60. Foner recounts the essays of New England
social philosopher Orestes A. Brownson, novelist Herman Melville, and demagogue
politician Mike Walsh, who compared a wage system itself to slavery. Id.
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developed during and after the Revolutionary War that freedom
was antithetical to working for others. 62 Dependent labor had
come to mean unfreedom, servitude, and Blackness. 63 It was not
enough that White working class males were no longer servants.
It was freedom from the control of others and ownership over one's
self which made one free.6 4 In this way, the Jeffersonian ideal of
the small, independent farmer as the "best basis of public liberty"
reemerged in Jacksonian America as a critique of early
65
capitalism.
The tension between the freeman identity and the reality of
economic dependence under industrialization was mitigated by
reforms
expanding
suffrage
for White
males.
"Before
independence, the right to vote had been subject to complex
restrictions, which varied from colony to colony. Everywhere,
property qualifications, while less exclusionary than in England
because of the wide distribution of ownership, barred those
deemed incapable of independent judgment-journeymen,
servants, apprentices, and the poor." 66 Working class political
freedom was won by an uneven process of democratization
"through the substitution of taxpaying for property requirements
in some states, the substantial reduction of the freehold
qualifications in others, and the widespread enfranchisement of
soldiers." 67 For White men, the process of democratization ran its
68
course by the Age of Jackson.
As a predictable consequence of the confluence of the
stigmatization of "Blackness" with the need to give something to
Whites who feared increasing dependence, universal suffrage
paralleled movements to fully disenfranchise Blacks.
As Linda Faye Williams pointed out:

62. See ROEDIGER, supra note 32, at 56.
63. See id. at 177-80.
64. See id.
65. FONER, supra note 31, at 21, 59. "Those who labor the earth are the chosen
people of God," the embodiments of "genuine virtue." THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES
ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 164-165 (1775). Thinking of Manchester and the
manufacturing cities of Europe, Jefferson feared that factory workers were bound
to become a dependent, propertyless mob, unable to stand on their own two feet,
incapable of talking back to government or to exercise independent judgment.
They would, in short, lack civic virtue. "Dependence begets subservience and
venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of
ambition." Id. at 165.
66. FONER, supra note 31, at 17.
67. Id. at 18.
68. See id.
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New York in 1821 and Pennsylvania in 1838 both eliminated
their property requirements for voting and prohibited black
male suffrage in the same stroke. From 1819 to the Civil War,
every state admitted to the union limited the franchise to
white males in their constitutions. By 1860, only six percent
of the Northern black population lived in states in which they
could vote (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode
Island and Maine) and only half of eligible black voters in
these states actually voted due to white terror at the polls.
The white republic was also defended in state referendums. In
the North between 1840 and 1870, equality with Black people
was overwhelmingly
rejected by white voters in 17 of 19
69
referendums.

In the Antebellum era, the White hireling was a political freeman
and the Black was not, with very few exceptions.
Chattel slavery did not exist in any other nation during the
years of significant working class formation. 70 As a consequence,
working class formation in the United States, beginning with the
transformation of indentured Whites into free laborers, went
hand-in-hand with a story of Black inferiority and White
superiority. Labor competition between Northern Blacks and
White workers motivated the newly enfranchised White workers to
reject Black political participation. 71
In this context, race
exclusion and White suffrage were predictable ways in which
White workers responded to fears arising out of the changes
wrought by industrialization. The legacy for White workers was
greater relative political freedom purchased at the expense of class
unity and the development of cross-racial solidaristic associations.
Although poor Blacks and poor Whites had much in common
economically, racial identity inhibited the possibility of cross-racial
collective action and working-class unity. This problem has
confounded class-based political organizing in the United States
72
for more than two centuries.
C. Immigration, Class, and the RacialBribe
From this Nation's inception, the race line was used to
demarcate and patrol the divide between those who constituted
the "We" in "We The People." Whiteness was more than just a
descriptor-it had a positive and negative dimension that were

69. Williams, supra note 23, at 4.
70. See ROEDIGER, supra note 32, at 46.

71. See id. at 56-57.
72. See Williams, supra note 23, at 10-11.
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related. Positively, it meant who could be part of the imagined
community-a citizen. Negatively, it was anti-slave and antiBlack. It was no surprise when in December of 1856, the United
States Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney,
declared that all Blacks-slaves as well as free-were not and
could never become citizens of the United States. 73 From the
Nation's founding, citizenship had civic as well as racial and
ethnic dimensions.
The Constitution empowered Congress to create a uniform
system of naturalization, 74 and for eight decades following the
Naturalization Act of 1790, 75 citizenship was limited to "free white
persons." 76 Race and citizenship were bound together on the
ground that non-Whites were incapable of being free. 77 Rational
forethought, capacity for self-control, and devotion to the larger
community were traits that many founders thought non-Whites
and European aristocrats lacked.78 In Notes on the State of
Virginia, Thomas Jefferson claimed Blacks lacked these traits,
partly due to natural capacity and partly as a consequence of the
bitter experience of slavery.7 9 Because this first legislative
definition of American nationality was racially bounded, the
definition of White was an issue of considerable importance and
demonstrable impact.
From 1830 to 1845, the proportion of the electorate made up
of foreign born voters rose from one in thirty to one in seven, with
"the Great Famine exodus still to produce the greatest decade of
immigration in antebellum American history."80 By 1860, the
number of Irish-born residents was 1.2 millions1 It was their
82
huge numbers which made possible and desirable a racial bribe.

73. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-05 (1856).
74. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
75. United States Statutes at Large, 1 Stat. 103 (1789-1873).
76. Se FONER, supra note 31, at 39.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 40.
79. See JEFFERSON, supra note 65, at 138-43. Women, although citizens, were
also denied the right to vote. This exclusion was justified on the ground that the
same natural incapacity existed. See AMAR, supra note 33, at 419-26.
80. ROEDIGER, supra note 32, at 141.
81. See THEODORE W. ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE: VOLUME

ONE 168 (1994).
82. See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 4, at 224-25. The authors discuss the
dynamics of the racial bribe. They argue that two of the goals of the racial bribe
are to "diffuse the previously marginalized group's oppositional agenda... [and] to
offer incentives that discourage the group from affiliating with black people." Id.
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At the time, Irish Whiteness was the subject of considerable
debate. The Census Bureau kept the Irish distinct from the
Nation's other groupings.83 A number of writers and ethnologists
derided the "Celtic race." For example, George Templeton Strong,
a Whig diarist living in New York City, wrote that the Irish
84
workmen at his home had prehensile paws rather than hands.
Similar adjectives were applied to describe the Catholic Irish race
in the years before the Civil War.85 Nativists also opposed the
Irish on the assumption that the Irish were subservient to the
Catholic Church,8 6 a claim very similar to the one justifying the
exclusion of women and Blacks.
No immigrants ever came to the United States better
prepared by tradition and experience to empathize with the
African Americans than the Irish, who were emerging directly
from the historical struggle against racial oppression in their own
country. "The two groups often lived side by side in the teeming
slums of American cities of the 1830s. They both did America's
hard work, especially in domestic service and the transportation
industry. Both groups were poor and often vilified. Both had
87
experienced oppression and been wrenched from a homeland."
In 1842, 70,000 Irish in Ireland signed an anti-slavery
address and petition,88 sponsored by the celebrated Irish
abolitionist, Daniel O'Connell, who led the massive repeal
campaign for Irish freedom through an end to union with Great
Britain.8 9 However, there are regular accounts of the Irish being
staunchly opposed to Black liberty in the United States after
1843. 90 For instance, attempts to restore the Black franchise in
the New York Constitution were thwarted in 1826 and 1846 by the
efforts of Tammany Hall Democrats, an electorate swelling with
Irish immigrants. 91
The Democratic Party positioned itself to take advantage of
the Irish vote by promoting a definition of Whiteness that

Both of these motives were present at the moment of the Irish racial bribe.
83. See ROEDIGER, supra note 32, at 133.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 138.
87. Id. at 134.
88. See id.
89. See ROEDIGER, supra note 32, at 134.
90. See ALLEN, supra note 81, at 187.
91. See id.
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expansively included the Scotch, Irish, German, French, and
Normans. 92 "The ways in which the Irish competed for work and
adjusted to industrial morality in America made it all but certain
that they would adopt and extend the politics of white unity
offered by the Democratic Party."93 The Irish decision is also
explained by the attempt to distance themselves from slavery and
the language of servitude.
By driving Blacks out of their
occupational niches, they could avoid the language that became so
abhorrent in the post-revolutionary environment. 94 This was not
only a move to disaffiliate with Blacks; it was also a move to reject
95
cooperation with Blacks and be invited into the control stratum.
While there were economic benefits to Whiteness, there were also
important non-economic social benefits.
The story of how the Irish became White is a recurring story
about the meaning of race in the United States with important
class dimensions, but not just class. The legal context, in which
only free White persons could become naturalized, inscribed race
into our definition of citizenship for the purpose of protecting
slavery while further racializing our class consciousness. The
political context, in which only Whites could vote, and the threat
to civic freedom posed by nativists, made possible a racial bribe for
immigrants forced to confront a racialized society and position
themselves within it. This racial bribe would overwhelm the
potential for economic unity among the two groups sharing the
same economic circumstances and a common plight. Racial fences
prevented understanding of common economic interests that might
have formed the basis for concerted action. To some extent, it is a
mistake to think of race being used in a particular campaign to
divide.
The very formation of racial structure and identity,
96
particularly White identity, is about separation and control.

92. See ROEDIGER, supra note 32, at 142.
93. Id. at 144. The conflation of nationality with blood may have troubled the
Irish who despised the English, but "within the constrained choices and high risks
of antebellum American politics such a choice was logical." Id.
94. See ALLEN, supra note 81, at 187.
95. See MARTINOT, supra note 29, at 59.

96. MARTINOT, supra note 29, at 64. See also powell, supra note 17, at 37. This
insight gives meaning to James Baldwin's phrase, "As long as you think you are
white, there's no hope for you." THE PRICE OF A TICKET (American Masters and
Maysles Films 1985). It is also important to note that race can be used and has
been used in the spirit of liberation and social justice. See GUINIER & TORRES,
supra note 4, at 81-82.
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D. Race and Class DuringReconstruction and Beyond

The struggle for independence by those freed from slavery
through the Civil War brought renewed national attention to the
appropriate role of the federal government.
Matters long
considered local in scope, including the provision of welfare and
economic help, were now matters of national concern and priority.
In Reconstruction era debates over the Freedmen's Bureau we see
the emergence of a discourse that continues to haunt us today.
Even when freed Blacks were brought into the political community
and granted citizenship through the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a well-imbedded narrative of Black inferiority and
legacy of separation worked to undermine and eventually reverse
economic reforms.
A comparison between the Freedmen's Bureau and the
veteran's pension programs reveals a two-tiered distributive
pattern that has characterized social welfare programs ever since.
Officially known as the Bureau of Freedmen, Refugees, and
Abandoned Lands, the Freedmen's Bureau was designed to
provide welfare services to freed persons and White refugees.97
The Bureau provided food, clothing, and fuel; established schools;
supplied medical services; supervised labor contracts between
freedmen and their employers; managed confiscated or abandoned
lands, leasing and selling some of them to freedmen; and
attempted to secure for Blacks equal justice before the law. 98 The
program was criticized by President Andrew Johnson and the
Democrats in the mid-nineteenth century, however, as likely to
make Blacks lazy, dependent, and prone to live off of "handouts."99
Opponents to the Bureau fretted about Black women's sexuality,
independence, and marital status, as well as the form and size of
Black families. They threatened the character and prospects of
freedman by implying that they did not have to work for a
living, 10 and worried that the South would become a "welfare
magnet."'101 In President Johnson's view, no such aid had been
97. Ohio Historical Society, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned
Lands, 2005, http://www.ohiohistorycentral.org/entry.php?rec=2107.
98. ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 65 (Harper & Row
1990).
99. Id. President Johnson vetoed the Freedman's Bureau Bill submitted by
Congress in 1866 characterizing it as an "immense patronage" that was
unwarranted by the Constitution and unaffordable given the "condition of our fiscal
affairs." Id. at 112.
100. See id. at 112.
101. Williams, supra note 23, at 7.
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provided for "our own people."'10 2 Moreover, the Bureau was
characterized as an immense bureaucracy, too expensive for the
federal government to pursue. 10 3 It was said to cater to special
interests, to be unfair to Whites, and very probably to be a threat
04
to harmonious race relations.
By contrast to the criticisms of the Freedman's Bureau, the
generous aid to Nrthern veterans of the Civil War and their
widows and children was viewed as wholly justified, and in the
end veterans' pensions became virtually an old-age insurance
program.10 5 Although this program did not formally discriminate,
it posed discriminatory effects because the eligibility requirements
disadvantaged former slaves. For example, Black Union veterans
and their widows experienced difficulty in providing proof of their
services-given requirements for marriage licenses, birth
certificates, and so forth.' 0 6 The effect of the racialized stories that
justified these distributive patterns was to circumscribe the
possibility of change by obscuring the common interests of poor
Whites and Blacks.
Research on prejudice documents that people are more likely
to be hostile toward those perceived as members of an out-group
on some salient dimension. 10 7 Proponents of welfare programs
naturally attempt to draw distinctions between economic classes.
Racial, religious, and ethnic divisions distract from those
distinctions and reduce the ability to forge a common class-based
identity. When there are significant numbers of minorities among
the poor, the majority population can be roused to resist transfer
0
of money. 8
The American situation is ideal for using race-baiting to fight
redistribution. The understanding and narrative of Blackness
that developed in the post-revolutionary environment ensured that
Whites did not see themselves as having commonalities with

102. FONER, supra note 98, at 112.
103. See id. at 111.

104. See Williams, supra note 23, at 7.
105. See id. at 6.
106. See FONER, supra note 98, at 112.
107. See ALBERTO ALESINA & EDWARD L. GLAESER, FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE

U.S. AND EUROPE 134 (Oxford 2004). Note that what is salient is not natural but
socially constructed and managed.
108. See id. However, racial and ethnic divisions do not always block
redistribution. When the racial minority is particularly rich (as the Walloons in
Belgium), then it is hardly natural to fight the welfare state by exploiting racial
hostility. Id. at 135.
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Blacks.1 09 As a consequence, Blacks were deliberately subject to
laws and programs that excluded them from the social and
economic benefits of life in America. The continued poverty and
stigmatization of Blacks are used by opponents of welfare to make
social welfare programs seem to poor Whites as little more than an
extravagant transfer of resources to an unworthy, ungrateful
other. 110
It would be a mistake to assume that these narratives
remained uncontested in the wake of the Civil War. Longstanding
social, legal, and institutional arrangements were swept away, and
the events of the Civil War shifted the thinking of a majority of
Americans.11 1 In just three years, President Lincoln's proposed
Thirteenth Amendment had changed from a measure offering
compensation to those states phasing out slavery before the turn of
the century to an enactment which abolished slavery immediately,
provided no compensation, and was followed closely by a
declaration of full citizenship for former slaves. 112 As evidenced by
the dramatic change of emancipation, there was a palpable change
in the opinion of the country regarding African American equality.
Black participation in the War 1I3 was critically important to this
change, and "[n]othing else made Negro citizenship conceivable,
[except] the record of the Negro Soldier as a fighter." 114 Also, as
the army eventually drove into the Deep South and "encountered
the full reality of plantation slavery, soldiers became imbued with
abolitionist sentiment," even those who had been Democrats
previously." 5 In 1864, White voters re-elected Abraham Lincoln
with 212 electoral votes to George McClellan's 21.116
Although the South remained defiant both in its treatment of
former slaves 1 7 and in the election of Confederate leaders to
109. See discussion supra Part IL.A.
110. See, e.g., ALESINA & GLAESER, supra note 107, at 165.
111. See FONER, supra note 98, at 2.

112. See AMAR, supra note 33, at 357.
113. See AMAR, supra note 33, at 358. Roughly 180,000 Blacks fought for the
Union cause, more than twenty percent of all African-American males of military
age. Id.
114. GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 115.
115. GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 119 (citing FONER, supra note 98).

116. AMAR, supranote 33, at 358.
117. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 120. As early as late 1865, Deep South
states began instituting Black Codes that required Blacks to have onerous yearlong labor contracts with plantation masters. The Mississippi law, for instance,
went so far as to include a clause that all previous penal codes specifying crimes for
slaves and free Blacks were still in force. See id.
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Congress, 1 the Northern push for equality was strong. News of
violence against the freedmen and the passage of the Black Codes
in addition to reports describing a revival of rebel political power
helped mobilize northern public opinion in favor of the Radical
Republican agenda of ensuring full freedom for Blacks. 119 "When
the Thirty-ninth Congress met on December 4, 1865, both the
House and the Senate refused to seat members from the former
rebel states." 120 Northern troops were sent back to the South
where military districts were established and reconstruction began
in earnest. 12 1 Republican militants swept the midterm elections of
1866, united on the issue of Black equality in the face of the most
virulently racist Democratic campaign ever. 122 As W.E.B. Du Bois
concluded, "for a brief period - for the seven mystic years that
stretched between Johnson's Swing around the Circle to the Panic
of 1873, the majority of thinking Americans of the North believed
1 23
in equal manhood of Negroes."
The legal transformation that occurred in the wake of the
Civil War generated new possibilities for multiracial coalition
building and the new consensus of the appropriate role of the
federal government. In the words of Du Bois, the "South, after the
war, presented the greatest opportunity for a real national labor
movement which the nation ever saw or is likely to see for many
decades." 124 Workers became a social force as the number of
production workers rose dramatically in the aftermath of the Civil
War. 125 The trade union movement inspired the multiracial
Knights of Labor. 126 Farmers in the Midwest, South, and West

118. See FONER, supra note 98, at 92. The South elected former Confederates to
Congress in December of 1865. The elected included the Vice President of the
Confederacy, four Confederate generals, six cabinet officers, and fifty-eight
Confederate congressmen. Among the policies these representatives threatened
included the elimination of the national bank, compensation for emancipation, and
lower taxes. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 120-21.
119. See FONER, supra note 98, at 102-03.
120. AMAR, supra note 33, at 366.
121. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 121.
122. See id. at 127-28.
123. W.E.B. Du Bois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 1860-1880, 319-20
(Athenuem 1935).
124. GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 133 (citing Du BoIs, supra note 123, at 353).
125. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 140.

126. See id. at 155. Michael Goldfield notes many examples of multiracial
solidarity within this movement. For example, at the 1886 Knights convention,
national leaders successfully insisted that Richmond theatres and hotels accept
African-American delegates. See id.
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mobilized on a large scale. 127 The Farmers Alliance party made
electoral inroads in many states. The Greenback-Labor parties
These disparate social forces
enjoyed numerous successes. 128
found united expression in the broad based Populist movement.
In the early expression of the Populist movement, it was the
southern White populist leadership that realized the need for
multiracial coalitions in order to succeed. 129 There is evidence of
extensive organizing of Black and White workers in the South by
The
the Knights of Labor during the 1880s and 1890s. 130
solidaristic associations that were a by-product of interracial
organizing efforts stimulated broader political activities that
attacked White supremacy. Populist leader Tom Watson took a
strong stance against lynching, an issue that was of grave concern
to Blacks. 131 "The freeing of Blacks from the stigma of slavery,
their newfound respect as fighting men, and the growing
abolitionism of many Union army veterans were all a legacy of a
war which helped redirect the labor movement to a broader
direction."'132 For the first time since the founding of the republic,
there was a possibility that class, and not race, would become a
primary organizing principle.
Early Reconstruction legislatures were marshalled by high
For
levels of Black voters and deep political mobilization.
example, voting turnout for Blacks in the early years of
133
Reconstruction sometimes reached as high as ninety percent.
Huge political rallies and meetings involving thousands of Blacks
were common.134 "[The] Reconstruction legislatures had a strong
class notion of the role of an activist's government." 135 "They built
public schools, hospitals, penitentiaries, insane asylums, and
orphanages."'136 South Carolina provided free medical care for the
poor and Alabama not only provided legal counsel for poor

127. See id. at 140.
128. See id. at 141.
129. See FONER, supra note 98, at xvi. As one Washington newspaper noted in
is impossible to separate the question of color from the question of
1868, "[ilt
labor ..." Id.
130. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 155.
131. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 160.

132. Id. at 146.
133. See id. at 121.
134. See id.
135. GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 123.

136. Id.
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7
defendants, but also protected minors from child abuse."3
Nonetheless, these revolutionary seeds were smothered by
the Hayes-Tilden compromise of 1877 with the withdrawal of
federal troops from the South."38 "The Dixiecrats, with the help of
new 'Black laws' of discrimination, psychological intimidation,
physical violence and murder, were now on their way back to
power in the South."139 Tacitly sanctioned violence was a critical
component of the repression that followed the end of
Reconstruction. 140
According to Eric Foner, 500 White men
indicted for the murders of Blacks in 1865 and 1866 in Texas were
not convicted. 14' The Ku Klux Klan assassinated both Black and
142
White Republican leaders, including at least one congressman.
The legacy of the failure of Reconstruction was the crushing of the
most active areas of Black political activism.' 43 The Black
agricultural labor force was by and large reduced to "the semifeudal condition it would remain in for another three-quarters of a
century."' 44 Any attempt by Black workers to organize met with
harsh resistance. The opportunity for a united labor movement,
North and South, Black and White, was missed. "The rigid system
of white racial identities and separateness of white labor was
shaken, although not destroyed."' 145 When northern labor battles
heightened in 1877, they went into battle isolated. The loss of this
segment to the Populist cause would contribute to the crushing of
the Populist movement in the South and the eventual
establishment of the system of 1896.

E. Race, the Populist Movement and Social Welfare
Spending
The 1870s through the

1890s was a transition period

137. See FONER supra note 98, at 364.

138. Underlying the Impeachment Crisis-History,the way we see it-Hon. Jesse
L. Jackson, Jr., 106 Cong. E19 (Extension of Remarks - Jan. 7, 1999) (statement of
Hon. Jesse L. Jackson, Jr.) (explaining that Rutherford B. Hayes, a Republican,
was elected President by one vote in the House in exchange for pulling out Federal
troops protecting the newly freed slaves in the South, and agreeing to appoint
conservative Dixiecrats to the Supreme Court).
139. Id.
140. See FONER, supra note 98, at 161-2.

141. See id. at 126.
142. See id.
143. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 135.

144. Id.
145. Id. at 117.
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featuring robust political activism. The energy that powered this
activism was unleashed by the incredible social, economic, and
political changes of the Civil War and Reconstruction era. 146 Voter
turnout for the presidential elections reached eighty percent from
1876 to 1900.147 The Farmers' Alliance, founded in Texas in 1878,
spread throughout the South, Midwest, West, and Northwest,
eventually forming the People's Party (the Populist Party). 148 As
the Nation's industrial economy blossomed after the Civil War,
production workers steadily grew as a political force, electing
Greenback-Labor candidates. 149 Even in the South, where the
Democratic Party tended to dominate state governments in the
post-Reconstruction period, opposing party candidates were highly
150
competitive.
The political activism and popular protest peaked in the late
1880s and early 1890s and came to a halt with the establishment
of the system of 1896. Populism in the North reached a turning
point with the Haymarket affair on May 4, 1886.151 The incident
provided the license to crush the Northern labor movement using
the power of the state, 152 and the Knights of Labor and other labor
organizations lost important public support. 153 The Southern
planters feared the alliance of Black and White farmers, 54 and
populism in the South was destroyed by a combination of violence,
terror and fraud. 155 In the last two decades of the nineteenth
century, hopes for a variety of political reforms had met with
disappointment and frustration. A long cyclical depression of the
'nineties intensified the distress of the much longer agricultural
depression. C. Vann Woodward argues that Blacks were the
scapegoat:
These "permissions-to-hate" came from sources that had
formerly denied such permission. They came from the federal

146. See id. at 137.
147. See id. at 139. We have not approached this level of political activity since
these reforms. Participation in national elections was sixty-four percent in the
2004 election. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau News, U.S. Voter Turnout
Up in 2004, Census Bureau Reports (May 26, 2005), available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/voting/O04986.html.
148. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 141.
149. See id. at 141.
150. See id. at 154.
151. See id. at 156.
152. See id. at 157.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 161.
155. See ALESINA & GLAESER, supra note 107, at 158-59.
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courts in numerous opinions, from Northern liberals eager to
conciliate the South, from Southern conservatives who had
abandoned their race policy of moderation in their struggle
against the populists, from Populists in their mood of
disillusionment with their former Negro allies, and from a
national temper suddenly expressed by imperialistic
adventures and aggressions against colored peoples in distant
lands.156

The crushing of Southern Populist movement permitted the
establishment of Jim Crow, an even more rigid system of racial
control. 157 In the South, the new Jim Crow laws kept the Black
and White segments of the working class separate. 158
The
infamous Plessy v. Ferguson 59 was decided in 1896, thirty years
after the end of the Civil War and two decades after the HayesTilden compromise.
These developments both preceded and coincided with
widespread
disenfranchisement
efforts.
Constitutional
conventions were held in Mississippi (1890), South Carolina
(1895), Louisiana (1898), Alabama (1901), and Virginia (1902) for
the purpose of removing Blacks entirely from state politics. 160
These conventions were made possible through violence, fraud and
other voting restrictions that overcame initial resistance. 161 In
fact, many of these constitutions were merely promulgated rather
than submitted to the state at large for ratification. 62 The
restrictions these conventions enacted were neutral as to race, but
had the effect of barring all Blacks and many poor Whites through
163
poll taxes and literacy tests.
Other Southern states found ways of implementing similar
laws without calling for constitutional conventions, amending
suffrage clauses of state constitutions through referenda and
implementing poll taxes and onerous registration, multiple-box

156. C. VAN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 64 (Oxford 1955).

157. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 161.
158. See id.
159. See 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
160. See BELL, supra note 4, at 580.
161. See id.
162. See id. This was done "largely to avoid a political battle and skirt the
embarrassing position of asking a good part of the population to vote for their own
disenfranchisement." Id. '"The absence of popular ratification was particularly
heinous in Virginia, where the citizens had originally been encouraged to vote for
the calling of the convention on the basis of the fact that they would be able to vote
on the new Constitution." Id.
163. See id. at 187.
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and secret ballot rules through legislation. 164 By 1904, the poll tax
was used in all of the former Confederate states. 165 The multiplebox and secret ballot laws operated as a kind of literacy test,
requiring voters to place their ballots in an appropriate box set up
for the election being decided. 166 Registration laws often made
voter registration deliberately inconvenient. "For example, after
1892, Alabama held registration only in May when farmers were
the busiest in the field."167 Some deadlines were set months in
advance, long before voters were interested or aware of the issues
at stake. 168 Sometimes specific information was required that
Blacks, as former slaves, did not know, such as age. 169 Over time,
as Blacks became more educated and economically secure, the
White primary became popular. 170 Disenfranchisement shored up
Democratic power in the South. Previously competitive elections
171
were now solidly Democratic.
Republican dominance in the North and Democratic control
of the South became the hallmarks of the system of 1896.172 "The
consequences of one-party rule and the new electoral
arrangements were a dramatic decline in voting participation in
the country." 173 Michael Goldfield suggests that "the distinctive
and exceptionally low voter participation rates and class skew in
voting that have been a characteristic of twentieth-century
American politics date from this period." 174
The long-term consequences
of this new political
arrangement for social welfare development and class politics were
steep. American political institutions, particularly the Presidency,
are selected by electoral votes, which favored the South before the
Civil War. The Three-Fifth's Clause gave the South and pro-South
candidates a substantial advantage in the electoral system, and
164. See id. "Between 1900 and 1908, North Carolina, Texas, and Georgia
amended the suffrage clauses of their state constitutions through referenda.
Florida, Tennessee, and Arkansas, with a combination of the poll tax and
registration, multiple-box or secret ballot rules achieved disenfranchisement by
state legislation action." Id. at 187-88.
165. See BELL, supra note 4, at 187.
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 188.
171. See id. at 187.
172. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 138.

173. Id. at 164.
174. Id.

Law and Inequality

[Vol. 25:2

Southern states like Virginia were consistently over-represented
in both the House and the Presidency. 17 5 For thirty-two of the
Presidency's first thirty-six years, a Virginian occupied the
Nation's highest office. 176
"In the first sixteen presidential
elections, between 1788 and 1848, all but four placed a southern
slaveholder in the White House."'177 "In turn, presidents would
nominate cabinet heads, Supreme Court justices, and other Article
III judges," among other appointments,178 who then had to be
confirmed by the Senate, a body in which the South held veto
power. 79 In fact, no prominent antislavery leader was appointed
to high executive office before the Lincoln administration. 8 0 After
the Civil War, these institutions continued to over-represent lowdensity, non-industrial states.' 8 ' The anti-industrial nature of the
Senate is even more extreme because agricultural regions of the
82
South dominated the Senate through the 1960s.1
In Europe, robust labor movements were a significant voice
for social welfare.18 3 In those countries, labor movements found
themselves comfortably at home within the ranks of one or
another political party. 8 4
"The comprehensive protection of
European welfare states inspires solidarity or at least unified
opposition to governmental proposals for austerity."'1 5 No such
home was to be found in the United States. Southern control of
American political institutions ensured that labor would never
enjoy the national support necessary to advance social welfare
development.
For these reasons, economists Alberto Alesina and Edward

175. See AMAR, supra note 33, at 158. Under America's first census and
apportionment, Virginia would receive six more House seats, and thus six more
electors, than Pennsylvania, although the two commonwealths at that point had
roughly comparable free populations. Id.
176. See id. at 158.
177. FONER, supra note 31, at 36.
178. AMAR, supra note 33, at 98.
179. See id. at 158.
180. See id.
181. See ALESINA & GLAESER, supra note 107, at 122.
182. See id.
183. See generally id. at 110.
184. See id.
185. MICHAEL BROWN, RACE, MONEY AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 358

(1999). As one commentator noted, "[A] middle-class European, thinking about the
poor, says to himself, 'There but the grace of God go I.' A middle-class American is
all too likely to think, perhaps without admitting it to himself, 'Why should I be
taxed to support those people?"' Krugman, supra note 25, at Al.
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Glaeser argue that the thin American welfare state is partly
attributable to race. 186 They support their argument by showing
that welfare payments are less generous in American states that
have a higher proportion of minorities 8 7 The Populist Party (the
first political party to focus on the redistribution of wealth 8 8 and
emphasize racial tolerance 8 9 ) was defeated in the South by the
use of race hatred, violence and fraud. 90 However, the Populists
did well in states with relatively homogenous populations, such as
Wisconsin.191 To this day, the Southern states are the least
generous to the poor, while those states in which the Populists
enjoyed success are among the most generous in their welfare
payments. 192
The juxtaposition of the failure of reconstruction and the
crushing of the Populist movement brings into focus the
interactive nature of our dual race and class structures. The
failure to dismantle our race structures, characterized by racial
separation and control, has had critical consequences for our class
arrangements. In the North, the unfinished agenda of the Radical
Republican wing gave way to the national economic agenda of probusiness Republican economic expansionists who were ambivalent,
at best, to the demands of Northern labor. 93 This shift was aided
by the weakening of the Republican party as a viable political
entity in the South. With respect to the interaction of race and
class, two consequences are clear. First, the radical Republican
impulse to dismantle the structures of White privilege mutated
into the new class politics of the gilded age, which were hostile to
Northern labor and a socially activist state, yet vigorously
supportive of an active federal role in subsidizing and promoting
economic expansion. Second, the undoing of Reconstruction and
the Populist movement helped reinscribe the race line once more,
so that by the turn of the twentieth century a new system of Jim

186. See ALESINA & GLAESER, supra note 107, at 133. According to their
analysis, about half the gap in welfare spending is due to differences in political
institutions, but the other half is directly attributable to racial heterogeneity. See

id.
187. See id. at 159.
188. See id. at 121. The Populists pushed for policies that would inflate the
money supply to alleviate the debt burden on mortgaged farms. See id. at 157.
189. See id. at 158.
190. See id. at 158-59.
191. See ALESINA & GLAESER, supra note 107, at 159.
192. See id.
193. See generally FONER, supra note 98, at 199-202.
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Crow was fully in place. This system of racial separation and
exclusion had considerable class impact. Long into the twentieth
century, the South remained a "one-party region" that used fraud
and violence to stifle dissent. 194 This power of the solid South, an
enduring consequence of Reconstruction's failure and the crushing
of the Populist movement, weakened the prospects for both change
in racial matters and progressive legislation generally, a fact that
comes into focus in the New Deal era.
F. Race and Class During the New Deal
Class and race directly intersected in the cluster of social
policies that emerged during the New Deal. Although Blacks were
still excluded from the benefits of citizenship through various
devices, such as poll taxes, they counted for apportionment
purposes. 195 The Southern Congress possessed legislative veto
power over all social policy. 196 In addition to the power of the
filibuster, a power proudly exercised, the Southern Democratic
Party was able to build "ramparts within the policy initiatives of
the New Deal and the Fair Deal to safeguard their region's social
organization.' 197 This was accomplished through control of senior
positions on key committees, "close acquaintance with the
legislative rules and procedures, and by taking advantage of the
gap between the intensity of their feeling and the relative
indifference of their fellow members of Congress." 98 The seniority
that Southern congressmen enjoyed was a corollary to one party
dominance in the region. This legislative power was deployed in
three ways to fortify racial hierarchy within New Deal programs:
(1) drafting of laws that were racially discriminatory and drawn
along racial lines; (2) insistence on local administration, which
protected Southern social, political, and economic systems; and (3)
prevention of the attachment of anti-discrimination provisions to
pending legislation. 199 "The early architecture of the welfare state,
created during the mid-1930s, thus bore the stamp of Jim Crow
200
racism."

194.
195.
196.
2005).
197.
198.
199.
200.

See Alesina & GLAESER, supra note 107, at 256.
See AMAR, supra note 33, at 87-88.
See IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE 20 (Norton
Id. at 22.
Id.
See id. at 22-23.
ANDREW BARLOW, BETWEEN FEAR AND HOPE: GLOBALIZATION AND RACE IN
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1. The Social Security Act
The Social Security Act was unparalleled in American
history. It was a permanent edifice of social welfare programs
providing for old-age pensions, benefits for surviving spouses,
unemployment compensation, and assistance for the poor. 20 1 But
because of exclusions of agricultural, domestic workers, and many
self-employed workers, sixty-five percent of African Americans
were denied its protections. 20 2 Only when Republicans gained
control of the federal government in 1954 were the occupational
exclusions removed and contributions on behalf of these groups
initiated. 20 3 Even then, many Blacks were unable to catch up
because of the requirement of five years contribution before
20 4
receiving benefits.
Provisions regarding aid to dependent children were made
less national in that the federal government shared costs with the
states, who in turn had discretion in setting benefit levels. 205 Once
a state had received a grant, it controlled expenditure. 20 6 Benefit
20 8
levels for assistance to the elderly 20 7 were also set by the states.
The unemployment insurance provision exemplified both
strategies. 20 9 It was less inclusive because it was limited to
workers whose employers had previously paid into the system in
addition to giving control over benefit levels to the states. 210 "In
short, each of the old age, social assistance, and unemployment
2 12
provisions of the Social Security Act" 21'1 took on racial contours,
and liberal, Northern Democrats acquiesced to maintain their
21 3
alliance with Southern Democrats.

THE UNITED STATES 37 (Rowman & Littlefield 2003).
201. See KATZNELSON, supra note 196, at 36.
202. See id. at 43.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 45.
206. See id., at 45.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 46.
209. See id. at 47.
210. See id.
211. Id. at 48.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 50.
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2. Labor Legislation
The National Labor Relations Act214 ("NLRA") and the Fair
Labor Standards Act215 ("FLSA") were important and even
revolutionary labor laws that helped improve the conditions of
working-class Americans. These acts were passed by means of a
trade of the votes of Southerners for the exclusion of farmworkers
and maids-occupational categories open to African Americans in
a racially restrictive labor market-from protection. 2 16
In
circumstances where Republicans opposed these laws, the
Democratic Party made racially relevant adjustments to secure a
winning coalition. 217 Although the predecessor to these laws, the
National Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA"),218 had no explicit
exclusion for agricultural and domestic workers, 219 the National
Recovery Administration ("NRA") retroactively read such
exclusions into the law. 220 The new arrangements were thus
friendly to labor, but inhospitable to the majority of African
Americans living below the Mason-Dixon Line.
In the 1930s, unionization was uncommon in the South but
"important to [Northern] Democrats who represented large
industrial constituencies." 221 However, low unemployment and
booming industry during WWII sparked fears that these new laws
would help undermine the South's racial order as Blacks were
222
being organized by labor while Whites were overseas.
Southerners were concerned "that labor organizing might fuel civil
rights activism," 223 and that "close enforcement of the [FLSA]
would cause wage leveling along racial lines." 224 "By the end of
1936, seasoned Southern Democrats feared that the New Deal was
reeling beyond their control." 225 The Southern Representatives
who had once helped construct the new labor regime flipped their
votes. 226 It was only at this point that Northern Democrats united
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

29 U.S.C. § 151, et. seq. (2006).
29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. (2006).
See KATZNELSON, supra note 196, at 55.
See id.
15 U.S.C. § 703 (1933) (partially repealed 2002).
See KATZNELSON, supra note 196, at 50.
See id. at 56-57.
Id. at 55.
See id. at 61.
Id. at 68.
Id. at 68.
PATRICIA SuLLIvAN, DAYS OF HOPE 4 (1996).
See KATZNELSON, supra note 196, at 61.
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to oppose Southern efforts to obtain broad agricultural
227
exclusions.
The new industrial unions and Northern Black voters were
important components of the Roosevelt landslide victory in
1936.228 Roosevelt argued that the low-wage economy in the South
stifled economic recovery and deprived the region of the benefits of
229
economic growth: better schools, health, hospitals and highways.
However, there were poll taxes and other obstacles that prevented
most Southern Blacks and low-income Whites from voting. 230
"This was the constituency of the New Deal," 231 and their inability
to vote in the primary elections kept anti-progressive politicians in
office. For that reason, Roosevelt "directly intervene[d] in the
primary elections of 1938, supporting the liberal candidates who
shared his commitments to a broad program of economic and social
reform." 232 This attempt to bring the South into line with the
national Democratic Party implicitly challenged the political
foundation of White supremacy by mobilizing disenfranchised
groups who supported the New Deal.233 The Southern response
was unmistakable in its opposition and fiery rhetoric. "Senator
Walter George of Georgia called Roosevelt's ... action 'a second
march through Georgia."' 23 4 Roosevelt's efforts ultimately failed
235
and combined with "Republican gains in the midterm elections."
It marked what many historians call "the end of the legislative
phase of the New Deal."236 Thus, the rhetoric of Reconstruction
and the racial ideology that sat at the center of it were once again
deployed to prevent progressive reform.
The South was a White, one party system that could ignore
Black interest. Democrats from the South enjoyed safe seats and,
through the benefits of seniority controlled a number of key
committee chairs. They exercised either a swing vote or a veto
over any legislation that would challenge White Southern rule, 237
and therefore were hostile to the interest of most White working227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See id.
See SULLIVAN, supra note 225, at 60.
See id.at 62.
See id. at 66.
Id.
Id. at 65.
See id. at 62, 65-66.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 104.
See id.
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class Americans as well. Although Republicans were "23 seats shy
of a majority in the Senate" 238 and fifty from a majority in the
House, "they found allies among Democrats who shared their
opposition to the reformist and largely urban agenda of the New
239
Deal and to the aggressive new labor movement it spawned."
"The power of the bipartisan anti-New Deal coalition was quickly
demonstrated in... Congress." 240 A spate of anti-labor legislation,
culminating with the Smith-Connally Act of 1943,241 exposed the
political weakness of the labor movement and the tentative nature
of its achievements. The defection of southern Democrats from the
coalition supporting labor issues was "devastating for unions and
particularly harmful for black workers."242 The product was the
Taft-Hartley Act, 243 which curtailed the rights of labor organizers
244
and unions generally.
As a result, union action was considerably narrowed and
constrained. "Unions continued to be relatively contained within
the enclaves of the northeast, midwest, and far west, with rather
low union density in... the south and the area between the
Mississippi River and the states on the west coast. ' 245 Efforts to
organize in the South virtually collapsed altogether after TaftHartley. 246 Unions moved to focus on workplace issues, such as
wages, work rules and conditions, and fringe benefits, and thus
limited the scope of union energy.
Instead of pushing for
government welfare programs for all who need them, "they
concentrated on securing pension and health insurance
provisions," and generous bargaining agreements for their
members. 247 This made unions less class-focused and a less
willing partner in progressive coalitions. Unions were the one
national force best able to articulate and organize around

238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. War Labor Disputes Act (Smith-Connally Anti-Strike Act), ch. 144, 57 Stat.
163 (1943).
242. SULLIVAN, supra note 225, at 104; see KATZNELSON, supra note 196, at 62-

66.
243. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136
(1947).
244. See KATZNELSON, supra note 196, at 62-66.

245. Sean Farhang & Ira Katznelson, The Southern Imposition: Congress and
Labor in the New Deal and Fair Deal, 19 STUDIES IN AM. POL. DEV. 1, 5 (Spring
2005).
246. See KATZNELSON, supra note 196, at 77-78.
247. Id. at 78.
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economic issues. These decisions therefore stifled the civil rights
impulse and unnecessarily narrowed it to non-economic issues.
Ironically, the constrained position of unions helped sunder the
issue of race and the question of labor markets so that the
emergent civil rights movement "transformed jurisprudence and
shaped landmark legislation without possessing instruments with
which to redress economic harms. '248 Once again, racial divisions
limited the political and economic vision and possibilities for all
Americans.
3. Veterans' Benefits
The Selective Service Readjustment Act,249 ("GI Bill"), was
"the most wide ranging set of social benefits ever offered by the
federal government in a single initiative."250 "Between 1944 and
1971, federal spending for former soldiers [under the GI Bill]
totaled over $95 billion."251 "More than 200,000 [veterans] used
the bill's access to capital to acquire farms or start businesses.
Veterans Administration mortgages paid for five million new
homes." 25 2 President Clinton called the educational, residential,
financial, and social changes brought about by the GI Bill a "true
social revolution. '253 It was under GI Bill interest rates and
thirty-year loans that Americans first became more likely to
purchase a home than rent.25 4 The domestic face of America
underwent a transformation that included the seeds of suburban
sprawl. "Residential ownership became the key foundation of
economic security for the burgeoning and overwhelmingly White
Equally impressive were the educational
middle class."25 5
benefits.
"By 1950, the federal government spent more on
schooling for veterans than on expenditures for the Marshall
Plan. '256 For the first time, millions of Americans acquired a
257
college degree, transforming the economic destiny of the nation.

248. Farhang & Katznelson, supra note 245, at 7.
249. Act of June 22, 1944, ch. 268, 58 Stat. 284 (repealed 1958)(provisions
contained in 38 U.S.C. § 3701 et. seq.).
250. KATZNELSON, supra note 196, at 113.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 115.
253. Id.
254. See id. at 116. From 1945 to 1954, the United States added 13 million new
homes. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See id. at 114.
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Although the GI Bill was formally colorblind, "there was no
greater instrument for widening an already huge racial gap in
postwar America. 258 The GI Bill provided for local and state
administration with Congressional oversight-oversight that lay
in the control of a powerful committee headed by Rep. John
Rankin, a Southern congressman. 259 As a result, Blacks were
excluded, rejected, and discouraged from partaking in the benefits
of a generous and formative federal program. 260 For example, one
provision in the Bill prevented an agency of the United States
from supervising or controlling any state educational agency in the
administration of educational funds during this era of almost
complete educational segregation. 261 Blacks in the South were
shunted into Black institutions with poor quality facilities and
fewer degree options. 262 Even the vocational programs under the
Because Blacks were
GI Bill had discriminatory effects.
discriminated against in many professions, they were unable to
secure jobs necessary to take advantage of the vocational
263
subsidy.
Thus, in the cluster of social policies that emerged during the
New Deal, class and race directly intersected with profound
consequences. Racially laden national programs widened the gap
between White and Black Americans in the aftermath of the World
War II just as a middle class first emerged. These New Deal
programs, therefore, were not merely discriminatory; they were an
affirmative action program for Whites. 26 4 Moreover, not only were
Blacks excluded from the full benefits of the programs, a fact
which results in tremendous disparities today, but racial fears also
induced proponents of these programs to narrow their scope and
applicability, and ultimately reverse their trajectory to the
detriment of working-class Whites. To understand the full impact
of the New Deal social policy, we need to understand how these
policies influenced class identity.

258. Id. at 121.

259. See id. at 123.
260. See generally id. at 127-29 (discussing the de facto exclusion of Blacks from
participation in the GI Bill).
261. See id. at 138.
262. See id. at 129-33.
263. See id. at 135.
264. See id. at 128.
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G. Race and the Middle Class
The class order that emerged in the post-war period was a
break from the past. Americans today have no easily accessible
perspective to appreciate the extent of this departure. The
phenomenal economic growth of the post-war period was shaped
by racially inscribed New Deal institutions to produce both the
economic reality and a new identity of "middle class." "The
unprecedented wage hikes (including increases in benefits,
retirement funds, and social insurance programs), coupled with
housing and educational subsidies of the GI Bill, transformed
many Americans' understanding of the basic rules of society. 265
In this way the institutional apparatus built during the New Deal
was instrumental in shaping the development of class identity and
defining racial as well as class interest. "By the mid 1950s, the
class consciousness of America was markedly different from what
it had been even in 1946."266 A 'look at the 1930s and 1940s
reveals open and intense conflict between workers and their
employers." 267 In contrast, the newly emergent middle class was

the embodiment of the idea that everyone could achieve the
268
American dream by cooperating with corporate America.
There is a prevailing assumption that class is primarily an
economic location. 269 In fact, "class is as much a cultural as an
economic formation." 270 The middle class is not organized around
income or even wealth. Instead, the middle class is organized on a
moral basis, built upon the concept of merit. "The narrative of the
American Dream - if individuals work hard and play by the rules,
they succeed-invariably trumps other explanations such as class
structure."271
Thus, individual hard work is the primary
explanatory variable for social mobility. 272 As a consequence, the
middle class is understood in individualistic terms of status rather
than economic status or group position.

265. BARLOW, supra note 200, at 33.
266. Id. at 34.
267. Id.
268. See id.
269. See Martha Mahoney, Class and Status in American Law: Race, Interest,
and the Anti-Transformation Cases, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 799, 804-05 (2003) (citing
E.P. THOMPSON,
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(discussing how class is directly related to economics).
270. Id. at 804 (quotations omitted).
271. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 4, at 103.

272. See id.
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(1964))
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This middle class identity reflects concepts of self,
individuality, merit, and access that impede change. Middle class
notions of individuality and just desserts limit the potential for
solidarity on the basis of class. With the arrival of the middleclass in the 1950s, working class consciousness evaporated from
American society. 273 Coalition building requires some basis for
commonality and solidarity. The middle class order does not offer
a class alternative for organizing understood in group terms.
Class-based programs are fundamentally conservative because
they reaffirm the institutional arrangements that support existing
class relations by attempting to advance particular individuals to
the status of middle class. "Political transformation occurs...
when we change asymmetrical power relationships, rather than
merely struggle for the right to participate in them." 274 To build a
sustainable, socially-inclusive majority, there must be a focus on
building conditions for shared struggles for change, rather than
just on advancing individuals to the status of the middle-class.
It is not simply that the middle class identity that emerged in
the post-war period replaced solidaristic narratives of class
struggle with individualistic narratives. The middle class is
situated upon institutional arrangements that actively prevent
cross-racial solidarity. "Class identity is constructed not only from
economic position,"275 but also through shared action and
experience, which is severely limited by educational, occupational,
and residential segregation. 276 In this way, the middle class
understanding that emerged affirms antebellum narratives of
racial inferiority while obscuring the ways in which the
institutional framework of the New Deal locked Blacks out of the
middle class.
"Residential segregation was systematically promoted during
the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s by federal programs such as the
Home Owners Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing
Authority, which insured private sector loans." 277 These federallybacked instruments used redlining, local control, and overt
discrimination to make it very difficult, if not impossible, for

273. See BARLOW, supra note 200, at 34.
274. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 4, at 147.

275. Mahoney, supra note 269269, at 804.
276. See id.
277. Martha Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 PENN.
L. REV. 1659, 1669 (1995).
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Blacks to qualify for mortgages. 278 "From the 1930s, through the
1950s, the FHA's Underwriting Manuals considered blacks
'adverse influences' on property values, and the agency instructed
personnel not to insure mortgages on homes unless they were in
'racially homogenous' white neighborhoods." 279 Under the FHA's
community eligibility rankings, 280 the "FHA actually refused to
lend money or underwrite loans for whites if they moved to areas
where people of color lived."28 ' "Although the FHA removed
explicitly racist language from its manuals in the 1950s, private
appraisal associations, real estate agents and firms, and banks
continued to use such language through the 1970s,"282 and the
earlier FHA system became part of the free market. 28 3 In this
way, the ranking system that the government initially used to
determine eligibility structured the market in ways that persisted
long after the market was scrubbed of explicit racial redlines.
"Thanks to the FHA, no bank would insure loans in [low-income
African-American neighborhoods], and few African Americans
could live outside [of them]."284
The FHA set national standards in valuation and appraisal
criteria that actors throughout the housing market adopted and
applied to reinforce and institutionalize racial housing segregation
on a national scale. 28 5 "Until 1949, the FHA [also] encouraged the
use of restrictive covenants banning African Americans from
certain neighborhoods." 28 6 Some "scholars have estimated that
racially restrictive covenants were in place in more than half of all
new subdivisions built in the United States until 1948, when the

278. See id.
279. Kevin Fox Gotham, Urban Space, Restrictive Covenants and the Origins of
Racial Residential Segregation in a U.S. City, 1900-50, 24.3 INT'L J. OF URBAN AND
REGIONAL RES. 616, 625-26 (2000).
280. The government would rank communities in terms of their eligibility for
federally-financed or insured loans. See Mahoney, supra note 277, at 1670 (1995).
281. Id.
282. Gotham, supra note 279, at 626.
283. See Mahoney, supra note277 277, at 1671 ("Federal action therefore helped
to create racialized housing markets: Once racialized community development
through the control of the real estate finance market was institutionalized as
federal policy, any private sector actor who went against the segregated norm
would have compromised buyers with federally funded or insured mortgages on
resale of the property, and the mortgage insurability of nearby properties, rested on
maintaining whiteness in suburbia.").
284. BARLOW, supra note 200, at 37 (quotations omitted).
285. See id.
286. Id.
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287
United States Supreme Court declared them unenforceable."
288
After Shelly v. Kraemer, "the Federal Housing Administration's
building and homeownership subsidies... drew whites out of
central cities, denied mortgages to blacks and channeled capital
289
into suburban housing construction."
The use of racially restrictive covenants in -the first half of the
20th century by the nascent real estate industry, local land
developers, and homeowner associations was important not simply
in the creation of residential segregation, but in the social
construction of race and racialized space. 290 Prior to residential
segregation, residents did not interpret Black culture or behavior
as connected to a particular place occupied exclusively by
Blacks. 291 However, "[k]ey actors within the emerging real estate
industry, as well as housing reformers and social workers, helped
nurture and promulgate a segregationist ideology and negative
image of the emerging black ghetto as a pathological, dangerous
and nefarious place, to be avoided by whites and other ethnic
groups." 292 The use "of racially restrictive covenants helped
nurture and reinforce emerging racial stereotypes that identified
black living space and culture with deteriorating neighborhoods
and dilapidated housing."293 Arguments that exclusion of Blacks
was necessary to preserve property values perpetuated such
restrictive covenants. 294 "Over time, the perceived connection
between race, behavior and place" has become a justification for
residential separation and disinvestment "in racially mixed and

287. Gotham, supra note 279279, at 618 (The Supreme Court struck down
restrictive covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).).
288. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
289. Gotham, supranote 279, at 618.
290. See id. at 629.
291. In Kansas City during the 19t b century, for example, Blacks lived in biracial
areas intermixed with both the wealthy and the poor. Before 1900, the average
Black person in Kansas City tended to live in a ward that was approximately 13%
Black. See id. at 618-19.
292. Id. at 617-18.
293. Id. at 618.
294. The National Association of Real Estate Boards ("NAREB") published
pamphlets and periodicals warning "that racial minorities threatened property
values and that neighborhoods should be racially homogenous to maintain their
desirability." Id. at 621 (citations omitted). NAREB "amended its code of ethics in
1924 to read 'a Realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a
neighborhood ... members of any race or nationality.. .whose presence will clearly
be detrimental to the property values in that neighborhood."' Id. (citations
omitted). A number of early real estate textbooks also stressed the importance of
segregation for maintaining neighborhood value and profitable land sales. See id.
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non-white areas."295 Black neighborhoods and eventually entire
cities became and remain stigmatized.
as racial
also functioned
associations
Homeowners
"They raised money to
gatekeepers in many communities.
purchase property from recent black homeowners, bought homes
from landlords renting to blacks ... and lobbied ... for the
passage of discriminatory land-use ordinances." 296 They organized
boycotts of "businesses who catered to black clients" and
threatened "suits to revoke the licenses of real estate agents who
sold homes to blacks." 297 Some called meetings and solicited doorto-door, 298 while others used "legal and financial resources to
enforce racial restrictions throughout the court system." 299 In
some instances, they went so far as to post threatening letters and
signs designed to discourage Blacks from moving into White
neighborhoods. 300 Importantly, homeowners associations fostered
White racial solidarity. The stereotypes that emerged were
disseminated by real estate firms and community builders 30to1
protect their investments in cities throughout the country.
Across the Nation, residential segregation is both a cause and a
product of what race has come to mean in America.
The combination of racially discriminatory public policy and
private discrimination produced entrenched patterns of residential
segregation and resource disparities that continue today in spite of
"numerous anti-discrimination statutes, Supreme Court decisions,
and fair housing legislation." 30 2 Achieving home ownership helped
White American workers achieve middle class status in socioeconomic terms and the thirty-year mortgage became the primary
30 3
mechanism by which most White families created wealth.
"Renters accumulate no equity, while homeowners almost always
secure financial gains that exceed inflation."30 4 For Blacks, these

295. Id. at 618.
296. Id.at 627.
297. Id.
298. See id. at 628.
299. Id.
300. See id. (describing one poster in Kansas City that read "Danger! Colored
people are hereby notified that they will not be allowed to live in this block. This
block is white and is going to stay white at any cost.").
301. This pattern occurred in Washington D.C., Detroit, Los Angeles, Chicago,
St. Louis, and Philadelphia, among other places. See id.
302. Id. at 629.
303. See KATZNELSON, supra note 196, at 115-16.
304. Id. at 163.
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"missed chances at home ownership compound over time."30 5 "By
1984, when GI Bill mortgages had mainly matured, the median
white household had a new worth of $39,135; the comparable
figure for black households was only $3,397 or just 9 percent of
white holdings."306 Today, in spite of significant past efforts to
reduce housing discrimination and important recent efforts to
address mortgage discrimination and boost homeownership rates
for people of color, the average net worth of White families is still
30 7
ten times that of African Americans.
The racism that influenced the New Deal programs and
excluded
Blacks
institutionalized
racial
disparities
and
opportunities. The invisibility of the racial imprint on middle
class consciousness and institutions makes it possible for
rejuvenated narratives of Black inferiority and unworthiness to
persist. The inability of people of color to enter suburbia, though it
was the direct result of federal programs, has been excused by
means of the familiar narrative of Black inferiority. 30 8 Whites
increasingly accepted the narrative of merit that they had
"earned" their homes and all the opportunities associated with it.
Thus, Whites described their rights in humble "bootstrap" terms:
homeowners rights were the reward for sacrifice and duty. 30 9 "The
government programs that subsidized white homeownership or
defined political boundaries to determine access to education were
taken for granted and remained largely invisible." 310 Segregated
neighborhoods allow segregation to be naturalized to such a degree
that today's residential patterns can be falsely perceived as the
result of "natural" preference. 311
The narrative of White merit was also understood as Black
failure. "Working class whites interpreted the 'wretched
conditions' in predominantly black communities as the fault of
'irresponsible blacks."' 312 White aspirations to upward mobility
"depended on maintaining residential distance from blacks, even

305. Id.
306. Id. at 164.
307. Id.
308. See Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v.
Board of Education and the Interest Divergence Dilemma, J. OF AM. HIST. 106 (June
2004).
309. See id. at 108.
310. Id. at 106.
311. See Martha Mahoney, Whiteness and Remedy: Under-Ruling Civil Rights in
Walker v. City of Mesquite, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1309, 1328 (2000).
312. Guinier, supranote 308, at 106.
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though it was the more affluent and educated blacks that sought
to move into white neighborhoods."3 13
"White middle-class
individualism, thus, is defined in opposition to blacks, who are
seen as an excluded but ominous group who do not share white
middle-class values." 314 Fears of integration were manipulated by
politicians and self-interested business people who used racially
31 5
coded rhetoric to divert attention from economic conditions.
Racial meaning with class implications permeated the
formative moments of institutional development, particularly the
rise of suburbia. Because it appears natural and inevitable, this
institutionalization supports narratives of inferiority and
unworthiness without the racial animus that drove such
narratives in the past. Consequently, this institutionalization is
much more resistant to change because opposition to race-focused
remedial programs appears rational. Racial segregation, largely a
result of New Deal policies, set the stage for White "backlash" long
before the civil rights movement.
As a consequence of this racializing of opportunity and the
work of the civil rights movement, the meaning of racism changed.
Although the stigmatization of Blackness continues, along with
racist attitudes and stereotypes, racism is based more on hoarding
than explicit animosity.3 16
Consider, for example, White
resistance to low-income housing in their neighborhoods as
deriving from a fear of lower property values. The class interest
encourages workers to seek multiracial and multinational unity.
On the other hand, as a person with White privileges, a White
worker also has a real material interest in preserving his or her
privileged access to jobs, political power, citizenship, social
services, education, housing, and so on. According to a study of
White neighborhood associations in Detroit in the 1950s, "bluecollar whites measured their individual success by their ability
to"31 7 distance themselves from Blacks, 318 and working-class and

313. Id.
314. BROWN, supra note 185, at 351.
315. See Guinier, supra note 308, at 105.
316. See David Theo Goldberg, Racial Americanization 6 (unpublished article,
available
at
http://ejournals.library.vanderbilt.edu/ameriquests/
viewarticle.php?id=15). Goldberg writes "segregation emerged as the dominant
and formalized modality of racism in the United States as freed slaves moved off
the plantations and into the cities." According to Prof. Goldberg, the full effects of
this development were already realized in the cities by the 1920s and 1930s. See
id. at 4.
317. Guinier, supra note 308, at 106.
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poor Whites expressed negative views toward Blacks more
319
frequently than other respondents.
Middle class identity and the assumptions that sustain it are
significant impediments to change and the development of a
broadly-based, socially inclusive movement. "The social processes
that"320 determined home ownership rates for "whites and not
blacks" 321 have consolidated racial attitudes and institutionalized
3 22
urban/suburban, "mak[ing] work on job development difficult."
Residence in public housing or the inner city signals lower-class
status, which is identified with undesirable employment
characteristics. 323 "Low levels of labor organization lead white
workers to interact less with leaders who are invested in building
multi-racial
solidarity."324
Diminished
working
class
consciousness coupled with residential segregation exerts a
conservative effect on White Americans. 325 Race provides an
account for the fact that "few working-class and poor whites
achieve their version of the American dream." 326 The merit ethic
of the American Dream deprives White workers of the tools to
engage in a critique that might motivate social change. 327 "Race is
part of the construction of class-as-status," 328 and this
individualistic ideology "is part of what defeats the development of
solidaristic consciousness." 329 This individualistic middle class
identity is an inadequate foundation upon which to build a socially
inclusive movement.
H. Race and Class Today
Race and class are mutually constitutive. They developed in
318. See id. (citing THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE
AND INEQUALITY AND POSTWAR DETROIT (Princeton, 1996)).

319. Thomas J. Sugrue, Crabgrass-RootsPolitics:Race, Rights, and the Reaction
against Liberalism in the Urban North, 1940-1964, J. OF AM. HISTORY 556 (1995).
"Among poor and working class whites, 85 percent supported racial segregation, in
contrast to 56 percent among middle income and 42 percent among upper-income
whites." Id.
320. Mahoney, supra note 277, at 1674.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1684.
323. See id. at 1674-75.
324. Mahoney, supra note 269, at 877.
325. See Mahoney, supra note 277, at 1684.
326. Guinier, supra note 308, at 108.
327. Id. at 108-09.
328. Mahoney, supra note 269, at 829.
329. Id.
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a mutual trajectory despite their distinctiveness. The economic
needs of Southern planters and the economic fears of the emergent
White working class played a prominent role in the initial process
33 0
of racialization and the outward spread of racial prejudice.
Today, the advantages of Whiteness, often understood in terms of
the benefits of suburban schools and high-paying jobs, operate as a
defense for the status-quo. The story of middle class individualism
is deployed to stigmatize the Black underclass as unworthy and
unmeritorious. 331 The social stigma of race is expressed through
332
social meaning, not simply individual attitudes.
Race has left a heavy footprint on class. Slavery ensured that
the emergent free White working class identified as White. The
initial development of the welfare state was shaped by a concern to
maintain Southern racial arrangements. In the twentieth century,
racial segregation has given a predominantly White face to the
suburban middle class and opportunities associated with it. Racial
meaning is a major reason why America treats its poor more
harshly than any other advanced country. The lack of a national
labor movement and the failure of working class parties in the late
nineteenth century can be partly attributed to our racial divide.
Had the Southern labor force become a part of a national labor
movement, today's class understandings would have looked quite
different.
Today, race has been used to draw support to a host of
policies that obstruct the development of a socially inclusive
agenda. Some Whites are willing to vote against redistribution
that would favor them because of racial animosity directed at
Blacks who would receive the same benefits.33 3 By the 1960s, by
which time segregated institutions were under attack and Jim
Crow was unraveling, White workers were unwilling to sign onto
universalistic social policies. 334 White workers acted on what they
perceived to be their short-term interest in maintaining racial
335
control over labor and housing markets.
Ultimately, the issue is not whether race or class perpetuates
the urban underclass, but how race and class interact to
undermine the social and economic well-being of most, if not all
330. See generally MARTINOT, supra note 29.
331. See generally GLENN LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002).

332.
333.
334.
335.

See
See
See
See

id. at 71.
ALESINA & GLAESER, supra note 107, at 134.
BROWN, supra note 185, at 166-67.
id.
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Americans.
In the co-development of racial and class
consciousness in the United States, class tensions have
consistently been relieved through the use of racial meaning. At
times, Whites have benefited, such as when Whites were given
suffrage rights. In the last seventy years, although Whites have
made gains, they are more limited as a result of our racial history
than they otherwise would have been.
III. Targeting Within Universalism: Using Race
Transformatively
Thus far we have examined the ways in which race and class
interact and interrelate. Race, racialized meanings, and racialized
narratives infuse our understanding of class, our political
arrangements, and our social space. Nonetheless, there is deep
skepticism about the utility of race as a mechanism for coalition
building or agenda setting. We have been schooled to think that
race may ultimately be divisive. The colorblind ideal is appealing
both to liberals who fear that race will divide their constituency
and to conservatives who think that race is an irrelevant category
and that racial classification is the real race problem. 336 Although
race may be a social construction, it is a category that continues to
influence the life chances and lived experiences of millions of
Americans. 337 Clearly, ignoring race will not change how it is used
to divide. Race operates perniciously through institutions and
institutional arrangements as well as symbolically through coded
meaning. A recent example of the latter is the infamous "Call Me"
political advertisement in a Tennessee Senate race. 338 Our silence
will not allow the issue to just go away. It is much too embedded
in our notion of self, individually and collectively, to just

336. See john a. powell, The Colorblind Multiracial Dilemma: Racial Categories
Reconsidered, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 789, 792 (1997). The move to anticlassification is
now evident in the claims made before the Supreme Court regarding voluntary
school desegregation. See Brief for Solicitor Gen. as Amicus Curiae, Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist., No. 05-0908 (U.S. filed June
5, 2006); see Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
AnticlassificationValues in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L.REV.
1470 (2004) (for an understanding of the origin and staying power of the anticlassification legal argument).
337. See powell, supra note 336, at 790.
338. This ad, which ran during the 2006 Senate race between Harold Ford, Jr.
and Bob Corker, is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cWkrwENN5CQ
The ad, purportedly mocking Harold Ford, Jr.'s bachelorhood, shows a White
woman who claims to have met Harold Ford, Jr. at the Playboy Mansion, thus
potentially playing on fears concerning interracial relationships. Id.
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disappear. Like the return of the repressed it will continue to
unwittingly define us until we constructively understand and
expose it to light. We must begin to understand the larger roll of
race, its relationship to class, and the transformative capacity of
race properly used.
I suggest that race can be a diagnostic and bridging tool to
advance racial justice efforts as well as a more inclusive social
agenda. Those who are racially marginalized are like the miner's
canary. Their distress is the first sign of a danger that threatens
us all, and their vulnerabilities reveal the places where the social
fabric is disintegrating. 339 Race as a diagnostic tool serves several
purposes. First, race consciousness will help inoculate any social
justice agenda from the negative, coded use of race. Second, it
helps us see how the fates of Whites and the fates of those raced as
non-Whites are linked-the miners and the canaries--how they
exist as part of a common social fabric threatened by the same
dangers. Finally, the transformative use of race may then serve as
the foundation to construct a broader social agenda. In this way,
race can operate as a bridging tool. I reject both the universalist
and the particularist approach. Instead, race as a bridging tool is
exemplified
by programs that typify
targeting
within
universalism.
As we will examine in Section C, infra, the
challenge is to integrate the interests of people of color with
working class Whites without losing sight of race. Many multiracial coalitions were built with this understanding. Demographic
forecasts suggest opportunities as well as challenges for such
efforts in the future.
A. Race as a Diagnostic Tool
Lani Guinier
and Gerald
Torres have examined
contemporary obstacles to racial and social justice and offer
"political race" as a visionary solution for advancing racial justice
in an increasingly hostile political and legal landscape.3 40 The
authors adopt the notion of race as a miner's canary. 341 Miners
would use a canary to alert themselves to the presence of
poisonous gases in the mines because "the canary's more fragile
respiratory system would cause it to collapse before humans were

339. See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 4, at 11.
340. See id.
341. See id.
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in danger."342 The authors argue that race, like the canary, is
diagnostic. The canary metaphor illustrates the need to address
the noxious gas in the atmosphere rather than blaming the canary
as an actor.
Like the miner's canary, race hints at and directs us toward
larger social ailments. This premise suggests the possibility for
building broad-based coalitions based upon common danger. The
problems facing racially marginalized groups spur those affected
to articulate the source of their difficulties. This articulation
invites a more systematic critique which may alert others of the
danger and inspire broader democratic experimentation. As a
diagnostic tool, race is a prism to focus attention on problems
which threaten everyone.
Hurricane Katrina illustrated a profound connection between
race and poverty in the United States. The geography of race led
directly to a disproportionate storm impact. Prior to the storm,
New Orleans was rigidly segregated by race. 343 Decades of
housing discrimination had kept the vast majority of the city's
Black residents in a handful of neighborhoods deemed undesirable
because they were susceptible to flooding. 344 Our traditional way
of thinking about race and racism as a product of individual
intent, Bull Connor racism, was not particularly helpful. This
mode of thinking about race focuses on assigning blame and
finding culpability rather than changing structures that
perpetuate disparities. By talking about race in a structural way,
we begin to see how structural arrangements help arrange all of
our lives. We can then apply this analysis to other urban areas.
Racialized poverty, segregation, and decaying infrastructure of our
central cities are common problems plaguing urban areas
nationwide. 345
All of the aspects of opportunity-housing,
education, job training, employment,
health care and
another structurally. 346
with one
transportation-interact
Housing location determines the quality of schools children attend,
the quality of public services, access to employment and
transportation, health risks, access to health care and public

342. Id.
343. See Maya Wiley & john a. powell, Structural Racism and Rebuilding
Communities, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. OF POVERTY L. & POL'Y, 68, 77 (May-June

2006).
344. See id.
345. See id. at 71.
346. See id. at 69.
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safety. 347 Like canaries gasping for air, the marginalized signal
broader problems in our democracy.
B. Race as a Bridging Tool: Targeting Within Universalism
"[H]ard and fast distinctions between universal and
particular approaches--and a strict preference for one over the
other-are unproductive." 348 For one thing, universal programs
are rarely universal; the decision of what will be universal is
almost always informed by the particularities. Even our most
349
ostensibly universal programs contain important exclusions.
Further, universalist and particularist approaches are false
choices. The failure to distinguish between the focus of a program
and its justification has obscured the complex dynamics of race
and wrongly suggested that government assistance programs must
either be race-neutral or race-specific. 350 The primary purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment was to bring freed slaves into the
political community and make them full members of American
society who could enjoy all of the benefits of citizenship. 35 1 Yet, it
did so in language that was universally applicable, providing
citizenship for all persons who were born or naturalized in the
352
United States.
Nonetheless, the universalist call is attractive, and "[c]alls for
more universalism, as a way of avoiding the race trap.... have
become increasingly common in recent years." 353 Population
segments potentially receptive to a broad, socially inclusive
message, such as working class Whites, may consider themselves
victims of "reverse discrimination" and feel threatened by race347. See id. at 70.
348. ANGELA BLACKWELL,

ET AL., SEARCHING FOR THE UNCOMMON COMMON

GROUND 146-47 (2002).
349. See, e.g., supra Part II.F(I) (discussing the Social Security Act).
350. See Paul M. Siderman, et al., Beyond Race: Social Justice as a Race Neutral
Ideal, 40 AM. J. OF POL. Sci. 33, 44 (1996).
351. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1873).
352. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Constitution guarantees that:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."

Id.
353. Jeff Manza, Race and the Underdevelopment of the American Welfare State,
29 THEORY AND SOCIETY 819, 820 (2000).
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focused programs. 3 4 Liberals seem concerned with finding ways
to appeal to low-income and middle class Whites as a panacea to
electoral woes:
Many liberals.., believe that the Democratic party cannot
hope to reestablish itself as a vehicle for progressive social
policies so long as it embraces the racial agenda of the 1960s;
it will only become a majority party once again to the extent
that it cultivates middle-class loyalties and sheds race-specific
355
policies.

However, as we have seen, such a policy inadequately accounts for
how race operates in the United States and does not offer a way to
break either racial or class inequality.
Grassroots organizers and coalition leaders must first begin
with an understanding of race before striving to build a class
identity that is largely lacking in the United States Mayor Dennis
Kucinich of Cleveland tried to build a progressive class coalition
without this understanding. 356 He called his strategy "urban
populism." 35 7 This strategy emphasized economic issues, since
these united various city constituencies, but downplayed social
issues, the most important of which was race. 358 In doing so, he
359
ultimately allowed race baiting into his reelection campaign.
Kucinich thus "destroyed his chances of uniting the city's black
and White working-class neighborhoods." 360 Kucinich failed to
learn from the multiracial successes of the populist progressive
movement in the nineteenth century or understand how this
361
movement lost its energy.
Commitment to interracial solidarity determines both
whether the constituent coalitions will obtain widespread support
and the level of commitment by supporters. 362 In the United

354. See generally Paul Burestein, 'Reverse Discrimination"Cases in the Federal
Courts: Legal Mobilization by a Countermovement, 32(4) THE SOCIOLOGICAL Q.

(1991)

(discussing backlash against federal equal employment opportunity

programs).
355. BROWN, supra note 185, at 359.
356. See Pierre Clavel & Wim Wiewel, Introduction, in HAROLD WASHINGTON
AND THE NEIGHBORHOODS 1, 14 (Pierre Clavel & Wie Wiewel, eds., Rutgers Univ.
Press, 1991).
357. See id.
358. See id.
359. See id.
360. Id.
361. See GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 156-63 (providing a good discussion of this
history).
362. See id.
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States, such a commitment has always been a source of moral
legitimacy and strength. 363 Because individual struggles in a
particular locale or industry are often overwhelmed by unified
state and/or corporate opposition, 364 the hope for decisive workingclass victory lies in broad solidarity across skill, occupation,
region, and gender. The Achilles heel of the labor movement-and
its greatest potential for broad unity-revolves around issues of
race. Interracial union efforts are more resilient in that they
bounce back more quickly after defeat. 365 Universalist approaches
have the effect of ignoring and undermining the very groups that
would be most likely to campaign aggressively for a socially
inclusive agenda. 366 Kucinich ignored this critical lesson.
Race is the most divisive, but also the most powerful
motivating force in the grass-roots movements of the larger United
States cities. 367 Even William Julius Wilson, one of the most
ardent supporters of a racially neutral universal strategy,
368
reluctantly concedes that efforts that ignore race will likely fail.
He asserts that non-Whites are unlikely to stay in coalitions where
By not including race
their racial concerns are ignored.3 69
explicitly, what messages do we send to communities of color?
Essentially, race-neutral strategies require communities of color to
abandon their well entrenched political identity as well as the
claims made on the state in the name of that identity in exchange
for an unspecified, unrecognizable, undefined identity in American
politics-a class-based identity.
Organizing efforts must unify race concerns with other
concerns in a constantly evolving "struggleo to find language and
development
multiclass
a
multirace,
[in]
metaphors...
There is a need to appeal to racially
environment." 370

363. See id.
364. See, e.g., id. at 146-49 (discussing the anti-Chinese movement in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
365. For example, in the coal and New Orleans longshoremen sectors, where
unionism was defeated while exhibiting impressive degrees of solidarity, especially
for the South, unions were able to rebound quickly. See id. at 160.
366. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 4, at 101 (discussing labor efforts to unite
multiracial communities).

367. See Clavel & Wiewel, supra note 356, at 14.
368. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE BRIDGE OVER THE RACIAL
DIVIDE: RISING INEQUALITY AND COALITION POLITICS (1999).

369. See id.
370. Robert Mier & Kari J. Moe, Decentralized Development: From Theory to
Practice,in HAROLD WASHINGTON AND THE NEIGHBORHOOD, supra note 356, at 64,

94.
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marginalized communities and then weave that message into a
larger mosaic. An alternative to both a universal program and a
solely particularistic program is to pursue what I call "targeted
universalism." 371 This is a "paradigm that combines a call for the
universal common good with attention to the particular experience
of minority Americans." 372 This is an approach that supports the
needs of the particular, while reminding us that we are all part of
the same social fabric. Targeted universalism rejects blanket
universalism and claims of formal equality. These claims ignore
the reality that different groups are situated differently in the
institutions and resources of society. Targeted universalism also
avoids the particularistic approach that refuses to see how middle
class and working class Whites are suffocating from the same
poisonous air.
There are many issues that "offer the possibility of shared
'373
goals even as they address entrenched racialized disparities.
The shift from equity to adequacy in educational reform
exemplifies an approach in which race is diagnostic and then
deployed as a bridging tool. In Leandro v. State of North
Carolina,374 for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court sided
with a coalition of poor school districts in ruling that the State
violated constitutionally guaranteed rights to education when it
375
simply stood by as children received inadequate educations.
The standard is set on the basis of what is optimal for society,
rather than on what is "equal" in a narrow sense. 376 Although the
interests of different racial and economic groups are linked
together through the same standard, the result is sensitive to the
disadvantages
that
economic
and racially marginalized
communities confront.
Another issue that has the potential to unify suburban and
urban communities is the issue of sprawl and the "smart growth"
377
The smart growth movement
movement designed to counter it.
is built around the notion that developers should be required to
371. See Theda Skocpol, Targeting within Universalism: Politically Viable
Policies to Combat Poverty in the United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 411 (C.
Jencks & P.E. Peterson eds. 1991) (introducing the idea of "targeting within
universalism" for the first time).
372. ANGELA GLOVER BLACKWELL ET AL., supra note 348, at 147.
373. Id.
374. Leandro v. State of North Carolina, 488 S.E.2d 249, 257-59 (1997).
375. See id.
376. See id.
377. See BLACKWELL ET AL., supra note 348, at 147, 157.
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pay the full cost of extending infrastructure to new developments,
internalizing an expense that was previously provided by local
Smart growth appeals to a diverse group of
government.3 78
In Virginia, Democratic Governor Timothy Kaine
interests.
managed to attract a slight majority of votes in solidly Republican
counties with the message "build the roads before building the
subdivisions." 379 At least one smart growth group in Ohio is
"promot[ing] state policies for land use that revitalize existing
cities and towns, strengthen regional cooperation and conserve
Such a message
Ohio's farmland and natural resources.'380
appeals to inner city communities who have long opposed sprawl
when there is a demand and need for investment in the central
city. 38 1 It also satisfies inner-ring suburban voters frustrated with
long commutes, over-crowded roads and highways, and poorly
The smart growth movement
planned developments. 38 2
exemplifies targeted universalism. A re-evaluation of the policies
entails an examination of the harms to urban communities and
their racial impacts,38 3 while also universally appealing to common
interests.
C. The Prospectsfor MultiracialCoalition Building in the
Twentyfirst Century
The realization of a broad, inclusive social agenda that
includes targeted universal strategies requires efforts to build and
sustain a supporting coalition. To advance a significant agenda, it
will be necessary to cultivate enduring coalitions that regularly
command more than fifty-one percent of the relevant vote. 38 4 An
378. See id. at 155. Suburbs have tended to create racial separation as the Black
and Hispanic populations stay in the inner cities or first ring suburbs. Id.
379. Joe Hallet, Sprawl Issues Could Give Lift to Democrats, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Op-ed, Feb. 12, 2006, available at http://www.greaterohio.org/medial
dispatch-op-ed-briefing-book.htm.
380. Id.
381. See BLACKWELL ETAL., supra note 348, at 147.
382. "[The soccer moms who can't get their kids to soccer practice on time
because they're sitting in traffic ... are pretty ticked off about it." Hallet, supra
note 379. See also BLACKWELL ET AL., supra note 348372 at 156 (noting that
policies that once drove suburbanization and facilitated middle-class exodus from
urban communities are now creating "stress and misery even for those in the more
distant suburbs").
See
383. "Racial avoidance has been one of the factors driving sprawl."
BLACKWELL ET AL., supra note 348, at 158.

384. Sheryll D. Cashin, Shall We Overcome? Transcending Race, Class, and
Ideology Through Interest Convergence, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 253, 274 (2005). The
Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, passed by a vote of 73-27 in the Senate. Id.
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electoral victory based on demographic maneuvering and policy
positioning is an illusory substitute for building a durable
coalition. A momentary convergence of interest can lead to an
electoral victory, but governance requires more. Slender electoral
victories are easily reversed. Embedded institutional actors, such
as administrative officials, are often positioned to resist or
influence policy implementation. Control over critical institutions
such as schools or housing may be dispersed among different levels
of government. 3 5 Agenda implementation will not be effective
unless these institutional resistances are overcome, a process that
necessitates a long term vision and a sustained convergence of
interest based on a sense of shared fate.
This coalition must be multiracial, multiethnic and
multiclass. There have been multiracial coalitions in virtually
every serious movement in the United States. The most successful
and progressive of these efforts have tended to be those that
addressed race explicitly.3 8 6 For example, there were important
movement,
coalitions
during
the
abolition
multiracial
38 7
Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the civil rights movement.
But because of their focus on race related issues, they may appear
to be less instructive today where issues of race are less central.
Census projections foretell a minority-majority nation by
2060 38 8-- a projection that represents great opportunities and
challenges for building multiracial coalitions. With rising
diversity, it is increasingly unlikely that a single racial group can
succeed in independently pursuing a policy agenda. The primary
challenge is to find ways to successfully broaden their coalitions in
ways that engage diverse constituencies.
1. Modern Examples of Successful Multi-Racial Coalitions
Harold Washington's period as Mayor of Chicago was cut
at 266.
385. School boards, for example, are municipal government actors while the
Department of Housing and Urban Development operates at the state and federal
level.
386. I recognize the difficulty in attributing success or failure to the movement
or the coalition. All of these movements, many of which were successful, have
contained coalitions that were failures. See Cashin, supra note 384, at 270
(discussing the Black power movement and Black skepticism during the civil rights
movement).
387. See generally FONER, supra note 31; GOLDFIELD supra note 11.
388. See Frank Pellegrini, The Coming of the Minority-Majority,TIME.COM, Aug.
31, 2000, available at http://www.time.com/time/printout0,8816,53774,00.html
(last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
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short by his untimely death in 1987, only a few months after his
successful re-election. 38 9 However, his victorious 1983 campaign
and mayoral administration provide an instructive example of the
prerequisites and limitations to a truly socially inclusive agenda
and supporting coalition. Washington was elected at a time of
changing demographics: the African American population had
grown to 40% of the city's electorate; Hispanics had grown to 8%;
and Chicago's White population declined from 60% in 1970 to
Mayor Washington's electoral base was
47.6% in 1980.390
overwhelmingly Black in composition. 391 However, the support of
poor Latinos and poor Whites was critical to his election. 392 As one
study shows:
In the primary of 1983, the critical ingredient was progressive
Whites. Although Washington received 80 percent of the black
vote, 17 percent of his coalition was White, and that provided
him with the margin of victory in the primary. In the general
election, Latinos provided the margin of victory. He was able
to improve from 25 percent of the Latino393
vote in the primary to
about 65 percent in the general election.
It is important to recognize that "the movement
underpinning Harold Washington's campaign and his early
administration was marked by aggressive, vocal, and independent
action on the part of people associated with neighborhood
organizations and community action groups. 394 "Washington's
election was a movement election." 395 Before Washington, the
power base in Chicago had been a coalition of business interests
and the White working class, 3 96 which kept the Daley
397
administration's so-called "political machine" in power.
Washington ran as a progressive alternative to the traditional
political machine, 398 tapping into a diverse reform constituency
that had been developing throughout the neighborhoods of Chicago

389. Doug Gills, Chicago Politics and Community Development: A Social
Movement Perspective, in HAROLD WASHINGTON AND THE NEIGHBORHOOD, supra

note 356, at 57.
390. Clavel & Wiewel, supra note 356, at 22.
391. Id. at 27.
392. Id. at 28.
393. Gills, supra note 389, at 52.
394. Id. at 52.
395. Wim Wiewel & Pierre Clavel, Conclusion, in HAROLD WASHINGTON AND THE
NEIGHBORHOOD, supra note 356, at 271.
396. See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 4, at 232-34.
397. See id.

398. See Gills, supra note 389, at 35.
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during prior administrations. 399 The community-based agenda
provided the basis for the mobilization of the Black and allied
groups. 400 It provided an organizational basis for his campaign
and the substance of much of its policy direction. 4 1 Similarly, the
in Los Angeles
coalition that swept Antonio Villaragiosa into office
40 2
was built upon vigorous community mobilization.
Although both Washington and Villaragiosa represented
particular racial concerns, they managed to build broad, inclusive
coalitions. For example:
Prior to 1983, no Latino had been elected as members of the
[Chicago] city council. Only 2 percent of city employees were
Latino, [and] only two Latino-owned firms had been awarded
municipal contracts .... In the four years following Harold
Washington's mayoral victory, these trends were reversed. By
1987, four Latinos sat in the city council chambers, more than
5 percent of the city employees were Latino, [and] 8 percent of
city contract dollars were going to Latino-owned firms .... 403
"Latino and Black interests came together on a range of
issues: affirmative action in city employment and contracts,
defense of communities against developers, education, and some
foreign policy issues." 40 4 Although Washington made great strides,
as one commentator explains:
the coalition between blacks and progressive whites appears to
have been easier to operate than that between Blacks and
Hispanics. Blacks and Hispanics [were] in a more competitive
situation with each other than either one [was] in with whites.
better in obtaining top
Blacks and whites did considerably
40 5
positions than Hispanics.
[Ten] percent of all mayoral appointments and 20 percent of
appointments to major boards and commissions were Latinos.
Hiring, both entry level and high-level hiring, was another
story.... The city's hiring of Latinos was lower than the
399. See ALTON MILLER, HAROLD WASHINGTON: THE MAYOR, THE MAN 97 (1989).

See also Wiewel & Clavel, supra note 395356, at 271 ("Without the unprecedented
mobilization that occurred in 1982/83 in the black and Latino communities, among
poor whites and in the community-based organizations, and among white liberals,
Washington would not have been elected mayor.").
400. See id.
401. See id.

402. See Guinier & TORRES, supra note 4, at 241.

403. Maria De Los Angeles Torres, The Commission on Latino Affairs: A Case
Study of Community Empowerment, in HAROLD
NEIGHBORHOOD, supra note 356 at 167.
404. Id. at 169.
405. Wiewel & Clavel, supra note 356 at 283.
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mayor had promised and much slower than the hiring of
blacks.... This was 4an
issue that was splitting the black
06
Latino coalition apart.
Black nationalists wanted to keep the maximum number of
appointments for blacks and were reluctant to accord
Hispanics minority status. In that sense whites were less of a
threat, because they would not take up "minority" slots. Also,
whites were more of an agreeable coalition partner for either
blacks or Hispanics than they
are for each other because
40 7
whites control more resources.
Understanding the challenges and opportunities presented by a
growing Latino population and the nature of the Black-Latino
divide is critical to our understanding of the race-class intersection
and the development of successful targeted universal strategies.
2. The Black-Latino Divide
Latino-African American coalition possibilities are important
to coalition builders. It is projected that "the Latino population
will eventually exceed all of the other minority populations
combined." 40 8 As one author expalins:
Both Latinos and Blacks are economically disadvantaged
relative to Whites; both experience substantial discrimination
in housing, education, and employment; and both advocate for

406. Torres, supra note 356, at 179-80.
407. Wiewel & Clavel, supra note 395356, at 283-84.
408. BLACKWELL ET AL., supra note 348, at 22. The authors of this book suggest

that California's demographic changes are a harbinger of demographic changes to
come in the United States. They further suggest that the way that California has
struggled with these changes may offer a preview of what is in store for the country
as a whole. Specifically, the authors point to: "anti-immigrant political campaigns,
statewide ballot measures that successfully ended affirmative action and most
forms of bilingual education, black-Latino struggles over ethnic succession in
political leadership, and countless other tensions." Id. at 23. The authors also note
that there is a racial age gap. A greater proportion of the population younger than
18 are people of color, while "nearly 85 percent of those of retirement age are
white." Id. at 24. A consequence of this fact is that there is a greater reluctance on
the part of the older and Whiter population to invest in the social infrastructure
needed by minority youth. Id. As a result, the educational investment has
"[d]ropped to the bottom of states in terms of spending per pupil." Id. This is a
problem that may face America as a whole and supports the contention, earlier put
forward, that racial heterogeneity leads to a decrease in welfare transfers.
However, now that thesis applies to basic public services. This is a scary thought.
Ironically, it is the tax revenues that these youth will be generating that will be
needed to support these baby boomers in retirement. This shows how we are
interconnected. Diminished public support for minorities that would enable them
to reach their potential may inadvertently threaten the social safety net of retirees
and hurt the future of the American economy as a whole.
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enlarging the social welfare state. In spite of these shared
interests, competition over jobs, educational resources,
housing, and political power often place Blacks and Latinos in
conflict against one another and this
conflict can act as a
4 09
powerful barrier to political alliance.
Leadership can make a critical difference. "Religious leaders,
Black and White, played a seminal role in the civil rights
movement. .".."410 Leaders in the new millennium must possess a
multiracial/multiethnic perspective that fully appreciates each
group's needs while successfully advocating for multigroup goals
that produce a greater good for everyone. 4 11 In the Los Angeles
mayoral race of 2001, Antonio Villaraigosa built his campaign
around a labor-left-Latino alliance that consisted mostly of Latinos
and liberal Whites.41 2 Villaraigosa lost. 413 His opponent, James K.
Hahn, had the support of the African American community and
moderate Whites. 414 It was not until Villaragiosa broadened his
coalition by reaching out to Blacks that he won in a landslide in
2005.415 The key to victory was forming a coalition across color
lines in the Los Angeles area. Critically, he mobilized non-Latino
voters by assuaging Whites and African Americans that he would
6
be sensitive to their interests.41
However, it is clear that sustaining a coalition between
Latinos and African Americans requires more than elite cues.
Electoral coalitions that are politically consequential because of
their durability derive their power from mass attitudes and mass
behavior. 417 "Recent public opinion data points to an asymmetry
in the affinity that African-Americans and Latinos have for one
another."41 8 "While 75 percent of Blacks feel a significant amount

409. Karen M. Kaufman, Cracks in the Rainbow: Group Commonality as a Basis
for Latino and African-American Political Coalitions, 52(6) POL. RES. Q. 199, 199
(2002).
410. BLACKWELL ET AL., supranote 373348, at 190.
411. Id. at 191-211.
412. Raphael J. Sonenshein & Susan H. Pinkus, Latino Incorporation Reaches
the Urban Summit: How Antonio Villaraigosa Won the 2005 Los Angeles Mayor's
Race, 38(4) PS: POL. SCIENCE & POL. 713, 714 (2005).
413. Id.
414. See id. at 714.
415. See id. at 719-20.
416. See id.; see also Arian Campo-Flores & Howard Kineman, A Latin Power
Surge, NEWSWEEK (2005), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7937184/site/
newsweek/page/2/ ("He neither played [his ethnicity] nor downplayed it," says
Rodolfo de la Garza of Columbia University. "It was just there.").
417. See Kaufman, supra note 409, at 201.
418. Id. at 199.
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of commonality with Latinos, only 33 percent of Latinos
reciprocate those feelings. And while Blacks feel notably closer to
Latinos than Whites, there is no such distinction apparently made
by Latinos. 419 Interestingly, the most robust predictor of LatinoBlack commonality is pan-Latino affinity. 420 "[Liatinos who feel
close to one another as a group are much more likely to feel close
to African Americans, while Latinos who identify more with their
own subgroup than the Latino collective are substantially less
likely to identify with blacks." 42 1 Unfortunately, "a strong sense of
422
pan-ethnic identity is not yet evident among Latino subgroups."
Despite commonality in language and religion, geographic and
nationalistic insularity has prevented the development of a sense
of cultural solidarity.423 On average, only about half of the Latino
subgroups feel that they have a fair amount or a lot in common
with Latinos of other nationality groups. 424
Unfortunately,
Mexicans, the most influential of the Latino sub-groups, have the
425
lowest level of affinity with other Latino subgroups.
There are reasons to hope that this may be changing. With
Latino's growing political presence, Latino leaders have taken
strides to inculcate a sense of shared fate among Latino
subgroups. 426 As more Latino politicians gain prominence, this
will create a feedback loop reinforcing a growing sense of panLatino identity. As one author concludes:
Several generations of African-American leadership, not to
mention the powerful socializing force of the civil rights
movement, have linked the fate of African-Americans to other
racial and ethnic minorities .... The strategic decisions of
many visible Black leaders and the content of their political

419. Id. at 203
420. Id. at 205-06.
421. Id. at 204. By contrast, perceived discrimination does not appear to
correspond with closeness to African-Americans. Id.
422. Id. at 201.
423. See id.
424. See id. at 203. In particular, Latinos of Puerto Rican, Cuban, and
Dominican descent see more in common with each other than with Mexicans,
Salvadorans, and Guatemalans. Id.
425. See id.
426. See generally Benjamin Marquez, Latino Identity Politics Research:
Problems and Opportunities 6, 2004 (unpublished article presented at The Project
for Equality, Representation, and Government at Texas A & M University),
available at http://perg.tamu.edu/lpc/Marquez.pdf. ("More recently, Latinos have
created their own professional associations, women's groups, business groups,
environmental associations as well as traditional civil rights organizations.").
Contra Kaufman, supra note 409, at 201, 208.
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rhetoric, in particular the notion of a rainbow coalition, has
arguably socialized many African-Americans to see themselves
as part of a larger collective. Within the last 20 years 0 a
large immigrant influx ha[s] placed pressure on Latino
political427 organizers to broaden their concerns and their
appeal.
With the recognition of a pivotal voice in the electorate, Latino
communities have a powerful incentive "to organize and maximize
their political leverage." 428
Fears of restrictive immigration
proposals have begun to mobilize hundreds of thousands of
Latinos 42 9 from diverse Latino subgroups.
As pan-Latino
solidarity increases, there should be a corresponding increase in
Latino affinity with African Americans-a prospect of tremendous
opportunity.
In addition, there is evidence that Latinos are
rejecting the racial bribe.
Over the last three censuses, the
430
number of Latinos that consider themselves White has declined.
The construction of a pan-ethnic Hispanic-Latino identity could
become the site for mobilization.
3. The Black-White Divide
Professor Derrick Bell has explained that one of the reasons
that Brown v. Board of Education431 has failed to live up to its
expectations is that the case's power to promote social justice was
shaped not by the intentional coalescing of a broad social
movement reaching across race and economic class, but by a
momentary convergence of interest between Nrthern liberals
embarrassed by American apartheid in the Cold War propaganda
campaigns, Suthern moderates, and Blacks. 432 Consequently, poor
Whites experienced a "downward mobility" forced by the
implementation of desegregation to associate with Blacks. 433 In
that way Brown exacerbated the interest divergences between
poor and working class Whites and Blacks. 434 In the words of Lani
Guinier, "[p]ublic education became a battlefield rather than a

427. Kaufman, supra note 409, at 207.
428. Id.
429. See N.C. Aizenman, Immigration Debate Wakes a "Sleeping Giant", WASH.
POST, April 6, 2006, at Al.
430. See Ian Haney Lopez, Colorblind White Dominance 18 (2006) (unpublished
article on file with author).
431. 394 U.S. 294 (1955).
432. See Guinier, supra note 308, at 103.
433. See Guinier, supra note 308, at 102.
434. See id.
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constructive gravitational force within many communities." 435
Derrick Bell's interest convergence formula holds that the
interest of Blacks in achieving racial equality will be
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of
Whites. 436 In a contest between White self-interest and White
racism, justice is the product. 437 This equation tells us that there
are opportunities for social justice where allies of social
progressives can identify and harness support of Whites.
As we have seen, conceptions of race have not been stable or
a given. Our understanding of race is a product of historical and
social conditions that have changed over time. It is inconsistent to
recognize that race is not fixed and fail to see the contingency of
interest. Harvard Law Professor Roberto Mangabeira Unger
reminds us that there are alternative persuasive ways to define
and defend group interests. 438 "Ideals and interests draw much of
their substance from their implicit institutional setting."439 If the
institutional arrangements are assumed to be a given, the set of
interests that a group sees at stake will be both defined and
defended as exclusive. 440 For example, "unionized workers in a
capital-intensive industry may see temporary workers or
subcontractors as threats, and seek ... collective bargaining
agreements [that protect the union from] encroachment by these
rivals."441 The definition of interest becomes preservation of niche
and the defense is one of exclusivity. 442 If the institutional
arrangements are open to revision, then both the definition and
defense of a set of interests is likely to be broad.
The conservative and exclusive defense has the advantage of

435. Id. at 114.
436. See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARVARD L. REV. 518 (1980).
437. See id.
438. See ROBERTO UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED 11 (1999).

439. Id.
440. See id. Although Professor Unger doesn't go on to describe the connection
between the definition and defense of interests, it should be clear that it is a
reinforcing cycle and neither the definition nor the defense needs to be absolutely
clear to each group before tentative positions are taken. If arrangements are seen
as rigid, then the definition is likely to be correspondingly rigid and the defense will
be more entrenched. A defense of an interest may be exclusive toward certain
groups as a starting position. As the definition of that interest becomes
increasingly rigid due to institutional rigidity, then the exclusionary defense of
those interests may follow suit and harden.
441. Id.
442. See id.
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seeming safe and tangible.
Thus, it is understandable why
middle-income White families might oppose busing programs
designed to integrate schools. Whites have a group interest in
protecting their investment in educational opportunity for their
children. Residential housing values are based upon school
quality and educational opportunity. 443 Educational opportunity
in turn influences occupational life. 444 The powerful history and
nature of residential segregation makes White-Black interest
convergence particularly difficult. "A strong causal connection
exists between the power of institutional arrangements to
generate such divisions, hierarchies, and roles and the relative
insulation of such arrangements against effective challenge and
revision. 445 By accepting a set of institutional arrangements and
their corresponding group antagonisms as a given, it becomes
impossible to see alternative persuasive ways of pursuing selfinterests.
Economic patterns are applying pressure to the definition of
White interest. Globalization unleashes forces which create a
crisis not only in the developing world, but also within the United
States. 446 As globalization takes its toll, the United States
economy is increasingly "bifurcat[ing] between jobs that require
little skill and education and those that require college or
postgraduate degrees. The 'college' premium, the average amount
that a college graduate earns over a noncollege educated worker,
was 31 percent in 1979.... By 1993, the college premium had
grown to 53 percent."447 This trend reflects the transportation of
448
low-skilled jobs overseas at a greatly reduced wage rate.
Moreover, although real wages have been stagnant, the rising
costs of health care, education, retirement, and housing have
further stressed the middle class. 449 Middle class workers work
450
longer and harder.
The economic condition and insecurity of the middle class
might suggest greater class identity between the middle class,

443. See, e.g., Sandra E. Black, Do Better Schools Matter?: ParentalValuation of
Elementary Education, 114 Q. J. ECON. 577 (1999).
444. See UNGER, supra note 438438, at 24.
445. Id. at 24.
446. See generally BARLOW, supranote 200, at 66.
447. Id. at 67.
448. See id. at 63.
449. See id. at 68.
450. See id.
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working class, and people of color; but this new identity has not
emerged. Instead of engendering great class consciousness and a
critique of the expanding prerogative for the elites, there has been
increased racial resentment: "Resentment, however, is not directed
strongly at those who are managing the economy, at those who are
reaping enormous profits and benefits, or at the system as a
whole, but at affirmative action, at nonwhite foreign (especially
Asian and Mexican) competition, and at immigrants." 45 1 One
author writes:
The dominant politics of this era has been to galvanize and
appeal to middle class voters' fear of falling. From antiimmigrant policies to attacks on civil rights policies such as
affirmative action, to a high-profile war on drugs, to the
expansion of prisons and the use of the death penalty, to the
war on terrorism, politicians have become highly skilled at
creating dangerous foes to attack and contain.... [W]ars on
crime create "the good" people and values by sanctioning "the
bad." The creation of fear of criminals has... shored up the
ideology of the middle class as honest, [hard workers and] the
claims that immigrants are taking away "our" jobs and using
"our" social services has... [been] a convenient explanation
452
for the declining standards of living.
In short, "[t]he global era's pressures means that an
increasing number of Americans feel left out of the social order
(i.e. denied access to stable jobs, home ownership, and college
education)."453 The erosion of the American dream may open up
new ideas about the "good life," especially the affirmative
454
responsibilities of corporations and government to civic society.
As Professor Barlow reminds us, "[tihe middle class order and
attendant norms embedded within its cultural conception became
hegemonic in the historically anomalous conditions of the postWorld War II era,"455 and it is certainly not the only way to
organize a social order. The forces of globalization have the
potential
to undermine
institutional arrangements
that
perpetuate institutional racism based on hoarding. Instead we
have the middle class seeking refuge in the new White
resentment.
Globalization is opening up new political and
ideological spaces. It is not clear if this space will be progressive

451. GOLDFIELD, supra note 11, at 7.

452.
453.
454.
455.

BARLOW, supra note 200, at 76-77.
Id. at 77.
See id. at 76.
Id. at 77.
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or reactionary. In part, it will depend on how we use race. 456
4. Building Solidarity
The present condition should counsel us not to assume that
the changing global world and the new institutional arrangement
will in and of itself entail new class solidarity or an inclusive
response. There will be a critical need for leadership to help frame
these changes into a transformative agenda. For the targeted
universalist, the development of solidaristic associations should be
supported by programs that are not susceptible to being framed as
zero-sum. The momentary convergence of interests is not a
sufficient condition to coalition building.
Whether a certain
alliance among social groups can be developed and sustained over
time depends on whether there is a trajectory of institutional
reform enabling the interest and ideas of participant groups to
converge. "[A] progressive strategy is flawed if its primary focus is
to win within the zero-sum world of elections." 457
Harold
Washington's campaign was the product of decades of cross-racial
organizing at the community level. 458 For the energy of the
movement to remain animated beyond an electoral victory,
progressives need to summon social justice commitments as a
459
moral force.
The Washington administration illustrates a limitation on
coalitions that are not sustained outside of the electoral arena.
When dealing with zero-sum issues, such as political
representation or public jobs, coalitions tend to break down into
racial antagonism. 460
In the words of Doug Gills, who was
centrally active in the coalition building efforts precipitating the
election of Harold Washington:
We took coalition building for granted. We operated as if all
we had to do was to proclaim movement politics or profess to
be a supporter of black-Latino or black-white unity and...

456. Charles Hamilton has suggested that targeted universalism failed in the
early stages of the civil rights movement. See Charles Hamilton Houston, Speech to
the National YWCA Convention, Philadelphia, May 5, 1934, available at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/houston/ywcatxt.htm. However, White identity in that
era was much more explicitly racialized.
Whiteness is no longer explicitly
understood in contrast to Blackness. See generally DAVID ROEDIGER, WORKING
TOWARD WHITENESS (2005).
457. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 4, at 242.

458. See id. at 245.
459. See id. at 247.
460. See id.
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Presto!-we got instant unity!-when our experience had been
that solidarity 461
is forged in struggle and then debated and
tested in battle.
Building a multiracial coalition depends on more than merely
adopting an attractive agenda. It requires a movement that seeks
to instill a sense of solidarity largely lacking in the United
States. 462 "Social and ideological conflict wear away the patina of
naturalness and necessity surrounding our views of agency and
alliance. 463 We must envision new narratives to replace those
which prevent coalition building. The crucible of struggle and
collective resistance opens up the potential for new stories that are
not zero-sum.
Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres provide an illustration that
highlights the ingredients of successful multi-racial coalitions and
the way that race can be used to bridge group interests and instill
a sense of linked fate. 464 The authors recount "the struggle in the
1990s to unionize a K-Mart distribution center in Greensboro,
North Carolina and secure a wage contract. 46 5 Sixty-five percent
of the workers were Black. 466 Initially in the dispute, two stock
stories framed the dispute.
One claimed that this was a
unionizing effort and, therefore, a labor problem. 467 The other
story claimed that this was a civil rights matter that only involved
issues of race. 468 In order to create a broader coalition, these
stories had to be superseded. Denying the salience of race would
risk losing Black workers and the Black community. On the other
hand, organizing the union effort solely around the issue of
discrimination would alienate some Whites and play into the
divide-and-conquer strategy that opponents of the organizing
effort were counting on.
The union eventually turned to the Pulpit Forum, an
association of Black pastors in the area for help. 469 The union
informed the Pulpit Forum "that the Greensboro plant--the only
K-Mart
distribution
center with a
majority
nonwhite
workforce-received the worst wages and benefits of any center in
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.

Gills, supra note 389, at 56.
See id. at 50-52.
UNGER, supra note 438, at 14.
See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 4, at 131-34.
Id.
See id.

467. See id.
468. See id.
469. Id.
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the country." 470 This in turn led the Pulpit Forum to reframe the
issue not in terms of labor or race per se, but in terms of whether
it was just that K-Mart should pay wages lower than any other
plant simply because the workforce was mostly Black. 471 The issue
was transformed from one of purely a labor struggle to one
implicating the welfare of the larger community.
K-Mart
attempted to undermine the coalition by suing only Black
protesters and Black workers for criminal trespass. 4 2 The White
workers remarkably asked: "Why weren't we sued?" 473 They were
affected by a wage structure that had raced them as Black, and
they joined in resistance. The movement successfully reframed a
labor or race issue into a justice issue that included both Whites
and Blacks.
Solidaristic approaches are difficult because their long-run
power is often insufficient to outweigh the advantages groups
currently enjoy. Today, Whiteness and the tangible benefits of
White space prevent working class Whites from allying themselves
with poor and working-class Blacks who share common interests.
The advantages of White neighborhoods and schools seem to
outweigh the long-run benefit of cross-racial solidarity.
A
progressive movement will have to "expose... alternatives of
development that lay hidden and invisible" by intimating a
different world in which we would become "(slightly) different
people, with (slightly) revised understandings of our interests and
ideals. 4 74
The development of a sustainable progressive
movement must take as one of its tasks the redefinition of its
participants as members of a democratic polity. A progressive
movement cannot take its members as individuals with predefined
interests and identities. Historically constructed interests need
space to be re-imagined.
One sharecropper told a student organizer that the most
important accomplishment of the civil rights movement, as far as
Blacks in Mississippi were concerned, was not the vote, but the
opportunity to meet.475 Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres offer the
imagery of building a sandcastle. 476 The fact that the tide will

470. Id. at 132.
471. See id. at 135.
472. Id.

473. See id. at 134.
474. Id. at 135.
475. See Unger, supra note 438, at 11-12.
476. See GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 4, at 149.
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inevitably sweep away the effort does not destroy the community
spirit that was generated by the activity.47 7 Building a progressive
movement and generating durable coalitions requires a change in
perspective first: the opportunity to envision one's interests and
one's identity in a slightly different light. At some point the
participants may need to learn how to stop the tide, but the goal is
not simply to participate in the building of a sandcastle
competition, but to learn how to work together and keep the
478
sandcastle standing for as long as possible.
5. Race in the 21st Century
One should not assume that non-Whites are the main
challenge to multiracial coalitions. African Americans have been
the staunchest defenders of a federally controlled, universalistic
welfare state from the 1930s to the present day. 479 History
suggests that Whites and the identity of Whiteness have been the
major impediments to multiracial coalitions i8 0 There are reasons
to believe that this is changing, 48 1 but not without a clear strategy
and adroit leadership. A simplistic focus on class would not serve
that end. Worse, racial neutrality would undermine these efforts.
We have already pointed out a number of shifts in racial
identities including White identities. The definition of Whiteness
was a matter of considerable importance to immigrants arriving in
this country in the nineteenth century. 48 2 "Slavery and Jim Crow
cemented racial divisions in U.S. society, creating a dynamic that
has framed all interactions across race and ethnicity." 48 3 How the
48 4
Irish became White is a recurring story in American history.
Eastern and Southern Europeans were, after a similar debate,
drawn into the category "White" during the early decades of the

477. See id. at 141.
478. See id.
479. See Brown, supra note 185, at 165. "Martin Luther King Jr. regarded the
Great Society as a failure," but only because it was "unequal to the task of
significantly diminishing the number of white and black poor, he thought; it failed
on its own terms. Many whites have failed to understand Martin Luther King's
insight that class and racial inequality are fundamentally linked and cannot be
severed." Id. at 363.
480. See MARTINOT, supra note 29, at 83.
481. See JOHN MOLLENKOPF, NEW YORK: THE GREAT ANOMALY RACIAL POLITICS

IN AMERICAN CITIES 123-24 (3d ed. 2001).
482. See BLACKWELL ET AL., supra note 348, at 48.
483. Id.
484. See ROEDIGER, supra note 456, at 8.
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twentieth century. 48 5 But it is not simply that racial and class
categories shift; racial meanings and narratives are equally
dynamic.
The civil rights movement was successful at changing
attitudes so that the era of the mass appeal of overt racism
appears to be over.4 8 6 Nonetheless, race continues to infuse itself
into policy debates today in less visible but no less potent ways. "A
new and cryptic vernacular for racial politics developed": poverty,
crime, taxes, rights, values, and urban development implicate
race. 48 7 It is impossible to separate racial meaning from these
"Through these code words, writes Stephen
discussions.
Steinberg, 'it is possible to play on racial stereotypes, appeal to
racial fears, and heap blame on blacks, other people of color, and
immigrants without naming them."' 488 The race issue undergirds
messages on taxes, guns, religion, patriotism, conventional gender
roles, abortion, family values, and big government spending,
making them attractive, 48 9 particularly in the South. For example,
opposition to taxes is not simply opposition on the philosophical
level; it is tied to the issue of federal programs, which to many
White Southerners means taxpayer supported programs to benefit
Black Americans. 490 Guns have become synonymous with personal
protection against a grasping federal government (harkening back
to Reconstruction) that could and would ram unwelcome
legislation down the throats of people, as well as personal
protection against criminals, associated so closely and for so long
in the White mind with African Americans. 491 Morality has also
long had a racial lining in the popular consciousness, in part, as a
consequence of the residential divide. 492 Even ostensibly raceneutral programs, such as aid programs with broad class benefits
for low-income Americans, have become publicly "raced" in White
485. See generally id.
486. Polls and surveys measuring interracial relationships show that growing
numbers of teenagers find inter-racial dating acceptable, as do parents. See Sharon
Jayson, New Generation Doesn't Blink at InterracialRelationships, USA TODAY,
Feb. 8, 2006, at 1A, availableat http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-02-07colorblindx.htm. In addition, Whites have generally come to support equality and
integration. See id.
487. Williams, supra note 23, at 2.
488. Id.
489. See id. at 10-12.
490. See id. at 12-14.
491. See Marcus Funk, Are Gun Control Laws Discriminatory?,3 MIGHT MAG. 59
(1994).
492. See GLENN FELDMAN, BEFORE BROWN 295 (2004).
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perception. 493 Programs like public housing, Medicaid, welfare,
and food stamps are marked as non-White. 494 As one author
writes:
[T]he stereotype of the single black mother as a long-term
welfare recipient who would rather have another child than
work her way off public assistance has driven welfare reform,
even though most welfare recipients receive benefits495for less
than two years and are as likely to be white as black.
There are reasons to believe that globalization and the
demographic changes will produce another shift in not only our
racial categories but also racial meaning. What is not yet evident
is the directions that these shifts will take. What is clear is that
the racial future of the United States is bound up with Latino and
Asian racial identity. 496 "Latin Americans for several decades
have composed the largest immigrant group in the United
' ' 497
States... [T]his population grew 58% between 1990 and 2000.
Some estimates suggest that by 2100, one in three Americans will
be Latino. 498 Despite the many possible futures that race could
take in the twenty-first century, 499 there are signs that growing
diversity may harden, rather than soften, racial divisions and
racialized cultural narratives. A study by Pamela Perry in two
California high schools may be a portent of the future.5 00
The sites of study were chosen to illuminate the meaning of
Whiteness under the light of contrast.5 0' "Clavey High is a large,
urban public school in a metropolitan area on the Pacific coast of
50 2
California with a majority African American student body."
Valley Groves is a similarly sized, suburban public school located

493. See Mahoney, supra note 277, at 1683.
494. See id.
495. BLACKWELL ET AL., supra note 348348, at 72.
496. See Lopez, supra note 430, at 3.
497. Id.; See also Betsy Guzman, US Bureau of the Census, The Hispanic
Population, Census Brief 2000, at 2 (May 2001).
498. See New Latino Nation, NEWSWEEK, May 30, 2005, at 28-29.
499. See generally Lopez, supra note 430.
500. See generally PAMELA PERRY, SHADES OF WHITE: WHITE KIDS AND RACIAL

IDENTITIES IN HIGH SCHOOL (2002). To a great extent, this Article has focused on
long-term processes that determine racial meaning. It may be helpful to see these
processes as shaping racial formation at the macro-level. However, race is also a
matter of individuality, of the formation of identity, which operates at the microlevel. See MICHAEL OMI AND HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED

STATES 66-67 (1986). Perry's study provides us insight into the production of racial
identity at the micro-level with consequences that shape racial formation generally.
501. See PERRY, supra note 500, at 42.

502. Id. at 1.
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less than twenty miles from Clavey with an eighty-three percent
non-Hispanic White student body.50 3 White students at suburban
Valley Groves organized their social world through a race-neutral,
norm-other logic. 504 This logic "was at least partially constituted
and reinforced by, on the one hand, little face-to-face association
with racialized 'others' and, on the other, a ... school culture...
derived from white European American culture but experienced as
natural, commonsense, and normal." 50 5 In contrast, at Clavey
high, a minority predominant school, race was the primary social
organizing mechanism of the high school. 506 Not only was youth
culture at Clavey divided and categorized with race as a primary
referent, but sports, school space, club activities and even the
curricula structure itself was racialized. 5 7
Associational
stereotyping pervaded the construction of Whiteness at Clavey
High. For instance:
the territories at Clavey took on racial meaning in part
because one racial group or another was numerically
predominant, but also because certain use values of the space
or practical behaviors within them simultaneously reproduced
and constituted particular racialized styles or stereotypes.
The "Lawn" was marked by whiteness. ... [t]he lower-lawn
was marked by50 Blackness,... and the 70 building was marked
by Asian-ness.
The implications of these observational differences are
profound. Whiteness becomes more central and more salient to
Whites in a world in which Whiteness is rendered visible. The
slowly changing demographic reality is that Whites in the United
States are projected to be a minority by 2060. 509 In such a context,
norms are no longer subsumed under the meaning of "White" nor
taken for granted as White, opening up a social space of meaning
and struggle not found in a predominantly White context. Perry's
ethnographic and social mapping therefore suggests an
opportunity that we must be poised to grasp at the same time that
it warns us of potential pitfalls. As Whites begin to inspect the
meaning of Whiteness in the context of a more clearly observed

503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

See id. at 14.
See id. at 42.
Id.
See id. at 20.
See id.
Id. at 63-64.

509. See Frank Pellegrini, The Coming of the Minority-Majority,TIME.COM, Aug.
31, 2000, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,53774,00.html.
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multi-racial society, the meaning of Whiteness grows malleable,
fluid, and open to re-interpretation.
The danger to be avoided is the social fact that a multi-racial
context also appears to rigidify and reify associational stereotyping
and racial cohesion. The social organization of Clavey High School
by race may open up a space for Whites to engage in a dialogue
over the meaning of Whiteness, but it also may tend to increase
social cohesion among Whites, make Whites more protective of
their identity, and less open to coalition building. This danger is
not limited to Whites. The rigid racial structure of the highly
diverse Clavey High School may paradoxically inhibit coalition
building between all races. This hypothesis has been anecdotally
confirmed in other contexts. New York City's non-Hispanic Black,
Hispanic, and Asian populations grew to 60% by 1990.510 Despite
having a robust history of mobilization for electoral politics and
protest and a generally more liberal White voter base, New York
511
City has been unable to form a durable multi-racial coalition.
John Mollenkopf notes that "the case of New York City shows that
whereas a city can become less white, it does not necessarily
become more Black."5 12
IV. Closing Thoughts
The argument advanced by this Article is that a socially
inclusive agenda must engage the interactive and co-constitutive
nature of race and class. This Article is written to challenge and
correct the assumption that racism and racial stratification can be
understood and addressed though a class lens. This reductionist
position is often countered by a different, but equally flawed
position: that race always trumps class. As an alternative to these
positions, I have offered an analysis that suggests that race and
class are mutually constitutive and highly interactive. Racial
arrangements have direct consequences for class structures and
vice versa. The crushing of the Populist movement and the failure
to build a national labor movement accelerated the development of
Jim Crow. Neither race nor class can be adequately understood or
productively engaged without a historical recognition of the
profound interaction between the development of the meaning and

510. See DAVID HALLE, NEW YORK AND LOS ANGELES: POLITICS, SOCIETY, AND
CULTURE A COMPARATIVE VIEW 158 (2003).
511. See MOLLENKOPF, supra note 481, at 98.
512. Id. at 115-41.
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structure of race and class in the United States. This interaction
is not a historical artifact, but, as this Article described, continues
unabated today. I assert that the failure to understand this
greatly limits the possibility of a more inclusive society that
invests in its people.
The mistakes made in the examination of the relationship of
race and class are caused by a number of factors. The mistake
may originate with an inadequate understanding of either race or
class. With regard to race, we are seduced into narrowly defining
it, and with this narrow definition in mind, we are tempted to
dismiss it. The way we think of racial issues is largely about those
populations categorized as racially marginalized people who
historically suffered as a result of racial prejudiced Whites. This
narrative is well-traveled in debates over affirmative action.
Notably absent from this narrative, however, is consideration for
the ways in which our racialized arrangements impact the lives of
poor Whites. Our thin welfare state, anemic labor movement, and
weak class consciousness are a product of our racialized
institutional arrangements. Whites only show up in the current
narrative as bad actors and perpetrators. Racial issues are seen
as special pleaders by non-Whites, drawing on the White guilt. It
is understandable that many Whites would not wish to see
themselves as perpetrators or follow the logic of this position of
having to pay for the injury suffered by non-Whites.
When
pundits argue a racial focus divides, it is likely this narrative that
they draw on. The wisdom of their arguments seems unassailable
as polling, focus groups, and voting patterns seems to confirm
White resistance to focusing on race. There seems to be more
willingness to address issues through a "universal" lens, such as
class. And yet, when one looks at prior efforts to implement
universal programs, they have been inadequate to address race
issues and to quiet the debate. Progressive efforts seem to falter
whenever the decision is made to submerge the race question.
Dennis Kucinich, the AFL-CIO, and the Populists all made this
mistake.
When race is understood more broadly, much of the rancor
dissipates. I have asserted that race helps constitute how we
understand class and class identity. Those who would use class
identity as a unifier instead of race fail to account for the weak
identification with class and the strong identification with race.
Indeed, I have asserted that class identity in the United Stated is
already a racial identity. I also asserted that while the issue of
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special pleader can be divisive, a more nuanced and historic
understanding of race is not. Race not only tells the story of how
non-Whites were treated; it helps define Whiteness, class
consciousness, and institutional design and meaning. In short,
The
race sets the terms for both Whites and non-Whites.
institutional design and meaning of race limits the social
imagination and constrains opportunities for Whites and nonWhite alike. I have asserted that this is done partially through
the ideology of hyper-individuality that embraces the isolated,
unorganized-self in the face of organized capital and business.
Even when unions have organized, in part because of our racial
history and in contrast to European labor movements, their scope
has been limited and private-oriented, focused on particular
The failure to
employees instead of workers more broadly.
adequately understand and address race, therefore, relates to the
failure to develop and sustain a robust class consciousness. I have
tried to show that this is not simply an analytical position, but a
fact reflected in our history. Contrary to received wisdom, when
the particularity of race is properly raised, it lays the foundation
for class and race solidarity. Part of what is required is a
universality that is grounded in particularities. An approach that
is just particular or just universal has not been effective.
I have also asserted that race and class are not just
psychological constructs. They are part of a narrative that is
supported and reflected in institutional arrangements. I suggest
that building effective multiracial/ethnic coalitions cannot be done
just through dialogue-there must also be attention to
institutional structures and design as we explore new racial
meanings. As the United States marches deeper in the twentyfirstcentury, it is clear that race and racial meanings and identity
will continue to change as they have thus far. As the ground
begins to shift, opportunities to re-imagine group interests will
arise and calcify once more. The difficulty, and the first step, is to
reframe issues and narratives that would permit groups to see
their interests in a different light. It is the work of political vision
to offer a competing narrative at a time when things are up for
grabs. Once a narrative can be established that reframes such
divisions, the possibilities emerge for institutional innovations
which may result in sustainable alliances. This will partially
depend upon how Latinos and Asians define themselves. We are
not helpless to challenge and shape these meanings. I recognize
that racial meanings and group interest are influenced by
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institutional arrangements and context. Our collective actions
and inactions create structures that perpetuate group-based
inequality, but also distribute meaning. Once structures are in
place, they appear to have a logic and momentum of their own.
This cycle appears as inevitable as it is vicious.
The challenge is that race neutral tactics are not up to the
task. A colorblind agenda is incapable of addressing many of the
structural problems that prevent the development of social
solidarity across racial boundaries. My analysis demonstrates
that class and race interact and are not separable. Segregation, a
critical institutional impediment, cannot be addressed through
universal programs.
Race operates through urban housing
markets to produce a uniquely disadvantaged neighborhood
environment for many African Americans, an environment that
builds a variety of self-perpetuating processes of deprivation into
Black lives.
Much of the literature on racial disparities examines the
race-specific effects of a particular outcome within a particular
domain at a particular point in time. 513 What is missing in these
analyses is the way that particular disparities accumulate over
time and across domains.5 14 The emphasis needs to be on dynamic
and systematic processes. For example, an investigation into
discrimination in the labor market misses the impact of
educational opportunities on labor market outcomes.
Raceconscious hiring policies may not have their desired effect if
limited educational opportunities fail to create a pool of candidates
to draw from.
Universalism assumes that its subjects are
similarly situated. Particular policies may assume that removing
a particular burden enables the beneficiary to advance. Both
assumptions may be flawed.
Public policies therefore must

513. This is a central point in my thinking and a distinction between
institutional racism and structural racism. Institutional racism examines racial
disparities within a particular institution - say segregated housing. Structural
racism examines cross-institutional linkages and the pattern of institutional
arrangements. See john powell, Does Racism in Motion Have to Stay in Motion?:
Nonprofits as a Force Against StructuralRacism, 9 NONPROFIT Q. (2002), available
at
http://www.nonprofitquarterly.org/section/320.html;
THE
ASPEN
INST.,
STRUCTURAL RACISM AND CMTY. BLDG., PROJECT ON STRUCTURAL RACISM AND
CMTY.
REVITALIZATION
46
(2004),
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/atf/cf/

%7BDEB6F227-659b-4EC8-8F848DF23CA704F5%7D/
aspen-structural racism2.pdf.
514. See generally Rebecca M. Blank, Tracing the Economic Impact of
Cumulative Discrimination,95 AMER. ECON. REV. (May 2005).
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address both race and class issues if they are to be successful. 515

"Race-conscious steps need to be taken to dismantle the
institutional apparatus of segregation, and class-specific policies
must be implemented to improve the socioeconomic status of
516
African Americans."
We are at a cross roads. Because of neo-liberal globalization
and the attendant stress to the middle class there is a growing
similarity in the conditions of Whites and non-Whites. The
current response has largely been associated with racial
retrenchment, even where, or maybe because, race is not explicitly
discussed. I believe that the best way to address this is to reconceptualize race and class in a way that would support solidarity
and induce a change in institutional design and meaning that
would support the role of government in investing in the lives and
infrastructure of its citizens.
This requires a new way of
understanding our institutions, a new narrative, and a new
understanding of race and class. It is my hope that this Article
can support such an effort.
This Article articulated the means by which a broad multirace, multi-class coalition may utilize race to frame and sustain a
national policy of social inclusion. This requires an understanding
of the transformative role and limitations of a race dialogue and
the relationship between race and class. We must be careful in
using race to avoid creating divergences within and between
communities that would sustain such a coalition. These goals can
be achieved by using race as a diagnostic tool that frames the
issues for a broader coalition.
The conditions of the most
marginalized racial minority should draw attention to
inadequacies in the social systems that harm everyone. Their call
for help can be a lens to focus attention on problems that an
agenda of social inclusion should address. In this way, race can be
used to craft policies with broad support.
In the face of resistance, resentment, and a seemingly
intractable status quo, it has rarely proved difficult to persuade
progressive oriented thinkers to compromise pursuits of racial
justice and equality in the name of political expediency. The
earliest and most enlightened American statesmen protected
African slavery for that very reason, termed a compromise, forever

515. See Douglas S. Massey, America's Apartheid and Urban Underclass, 68
SERVICE REV. 471, 482 (1994).
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etched, to our shame, in the Constitution. 517 Radicals in the
Jacksonian era, who deeply felt the dissonance between the
revolutionary ideals and the existence of growing wage labor in a
slave society, compromised principled calls for the abolition of
slavery in favor of what they felt were attainable, political goals of
improving the conditions of Northern workers. 518 Although the
content of the algorithm changes in each era, the logic remains the
same. Race seems divisive, secondary, and impractical in a
platform for a broadly based, socially inclusive movement. This is
an error of enormous magnitude.
There never has been, at least in twentieth century America,
519
a broad based political movement built solely on class.
Americans do not think of themselves purely in class terms.
Instead, a movement that seeks to shape the national agenda has
to recognize multiple identities, race being one of the most
important. 520 Since White supremacy is corrosive to inclusive,
broad-based politics, it is necessary to find a way to speak to
racial, class, and gender issues along with a host of other identity
issues frankly and honestly and in ways that promise inclusion
with ideas like targeted universalism and with language that
unashamedly embraces American values of justice.

517. See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 2.

518. See Harry Frankel, The Jacksonian Period in American History, 7 FOURTH
INT'L 365-68 (1946), available at http://www.marxist.orglarchivelbraverman/1946/
12/jacksonlhtm.
519. See Email from Kevin Boyle, Professor of History, Ohio State University, to
john powell, Director, Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race & Ethnicity (Jan. 6,
2006).
520. See id.

